

A SECOND CENTER OF PENINSULAR GRAVITY: WELLINGTON'S LOGISTICAL RESCUE OF CADIZ IN 1810

**A MONOGRAPH
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
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
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ABSTRACT

A SECOND CENTER OF PENINSULAR GRAVITY: WELLINGTON'S LOGISTICAL RESCUE OF CADIZ IN 1810 by Major James P. Herson, Jr., USA, 65 pages.

RESEARCH QUESTION: Did Wellington's decision to divert vital supplies, manpower, and naval assets from his precarious position in Lisbon to capitalize on the opportunity of protecting Spain's revolutionary capital of Cadiz, directly contribute to victory in the Peninsula?

Napoleon Bonaparte lost over 300,000 men in the Iberian Peninsula combating the British Army and Navy, along with their Spanish and Portuguese allies, in the savage conventional and unconventional Peninsular War. This very important sub-theater of the Napoleonic Wars set the pre-conditions for the eventual defeat of the First French Empire.

The Peninsular War served as a source of strategic consumption for the Grande Armée. Many scholars consider this significant loss of irreplaceable French combat power as an important contributing factor in Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812. It is my opinion that the successful allied defense of Cadiz served as a focal point for rising Spanish nationalism and exacerbated the effects of the 'Spanish ulcer' whose passionate resistance so debilitated the French Army. This rebuilding of recognized Spanish resistance against the French gave the Duke of Wellington a complementary center of gravity for allied civil and military resistance outside of Lisbon within the Iberian Peninsula.

This joint and combined military operation is unique in the annals of the Peninsular War. Outside of the British Isles, Cadiz was the only belligerent national capital city, stretching from frigid Moscow to semi-tropical Lisbon, that did not fall at some point to the Grande Armée. The age old rhetorical question, how does a shark which is supreme within its element of water, fight a tiger, which is conversely supreme on land? When using this analogy of comparing the combative prowess of the British Navy against the Grande Armée, the principal geographical forum which enabled the two military predators to pit their respective strengths against one another was the Spanish revolutionary capital of Cadiz on the Island of Leon. This struggle, which lasted some thirty months, saw the considerable sea power of Britain used against the formidable land power of France. Success in the Peninsular War proved crucial to the allied cause, and disastrous in turn, for the land locked French and their overextended Emperor.

Britain's sole Peninsular ally, Portugal, depended entirely upon Britain for her defense and gradual rebuilding of a credible military establishment. With the establishment of Cadiz as the new revolutionary capital of Spain in February 1810, the British government recognized the diplomatic, propaganda, and military value of having Spain as a second active ally in the war against Napoleon in the Peninsula. Wellington correctly deduced his government's reaction and so spearheaded the logistical and military rescue of Cadiz before receiving British government approval.

Although Wellington's military position was almost desperate, he recognized the importance of protecting the 'potential value' of Cadiz. Taking a risk, Wellington diverted badly needed supplies, specie, manpower, and sea power to Cadiz to enable the fledgling Spanish government to survive. This logistical rescue provided the infant Spanish government immediate military protection and necessary means for survival with the collapse of the regular Spanish armies in Andalusia.

INTRODUCTION:

“The more I see of war, the more I realize how it all depends on administration and transportation ...It takes little skill or imagination to see where you would like your army to be and when; it takes much knowledge and hard work to know where you can place your forces and whether you can maintain them there. A real knowledge of supply and movement factors must be the basis of every leader’s plan; only then can he know how and when to take risks with those factors, and battles won by taking risks.”¹

--Napoleon

Carl Von Clausewitz is probably the most recognized military writer of the western world, especially within the military establishment of the United States. His preeminent work, On War, is one of the most cited (and frequently misquoted) works used by American military officers in their quest to articulate their perspective on some particular operational or strategic issue.² Clausewitz deemed Napoleon Bonaparte, “The God of War” mainly because his impact upon the 19th century European military and political stage was so profound. Moreover it was Napoleon’s paradigm breaking campaigns which formed the genesis for Clausewitz’s own pioneering work on warfare.³

Clausewitz uses several terms that require further elaboration in relation to the Peninsular War, a very important sub theater of the Napoleonic wars. One of Clausewitz’s terms, “the center of gravity” (henceforth abbreviated as COG) is most simply defined as the crux or hub of the enemy’s power. He opined that by successfully destroying the enemy’s COG, then the enemy will be mortally wounded and unable to complete their war aims. A general interpretation of Clausewitz’s COG is that the center of mass of the enemy’s army is it’s defacto center of gravity. Destroy the enemy army

and you have essentially won the war and attained your aims. However, Clausewitz additionally defines, and sometimes complicates, this simple definition by further articulating,

In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital. In small countries that rely on larger ones, it usually the army of the protector. Among alliances, it lies in the community of interest, and in popular uprisings it is the personalities of the leaders and public opinion. It is against these that our energies should be directed. If the enemy is thrown off balance, he must not be given time to recover. Blow after blow must be aimed in the same direction: the victor, in other words, must strike with all his strength and not just against a fraction of the enemy's. Not by taking things the easy way---using superior strength to filch some province, preferring the security of this minor conquest to great success---but by constantly seeking out the center of his power, by doing all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy.⁴ (This author's underline.)

The successful Anglo-Iberian defense of Cadiz served as a focal point for rising Spanish nationalism, coordination point for partisan operations,⁵ conduit for substantial British monetary aid, and overall, exacerbated the effects of the 'Spanish ulcer' that so debilitated the French Army.⁶ This rebuilding of recognized Spanish resistance against the French provided the British CINC (Sir Arthur Wellesley, the future Duke of Wellington) a complementary center of gravity for allied civil and military resistance outside of Lisbon within the Iberian Peninsula. The French failure to treat Cadiz as a COG clearly had a deleterious effect on their efforts to subdue the Peninsula.

Great Britain early on recognized Cadiz as a crucial COG in the Iberian Peninsula, whereas the French did not, with correspondingly disastrous results.⁷

You will observe that after the refusal of the Junta to admit a British garrison into Cadiz, the attention of the British Government was more particularly and exclusively turned to the security of Portugal;...In the event of Sir Arthur Wellesely's being of position that the occupation of Cadiz is essentially important for the safety of the British Army, your

Excellency is to describe it to the Spanish Government as the condition *sine quid non* of the employment of the British Army in Spain.⁸

Although Wellington's military position was almost desperate, he recognized the importance of protecting the 'potential value' of Cadiz.⁹ Taking a risk, Wellington diverted badly needed supplies, specie, troops, and sea power to Cadiz to enable the fledgling Spanish government to survive following the highly successful French Andalusian campaign of January-February 1810.¹⁰ This logistical rescue provided the infant Spanish government with immediate military protection and the necessary means for survival following the collapse of her armies in Andalusia.¹¹ Although not challenged with running an empire while concurrently conducting complex military campaigns like Napoleon, Wellington, nonetheless, possessed a remarkable strategic and political sense. What's less considered and appreciated was Wellington's formidable ability to coordinate both strategic and operational logistical strategy into all facets of his generalship. In particular, his outstanding use of supportive and supportable logistics systems gave him an edge that his French opponents could not hope to duplicate. Wellington detached considerable troop and logistical assets to resource this other COG before receiving official permission and compensating logistical support from the British War Office.¹² His recognition and actions on behalf of this other COG (although he never used that term) played a crucial role in the eventual success of the allies in the Peninsular War.

By late 1809 Wellington had retreated to the outskirts of Lisbon in order to build the formidable defensive lines of Torres Vedres, since he could not hope to contest the French in the open.¹³ Moreover, Wellington's defensive stance along the Torres Vedres enabled his army to continue to be a convincing conventional threat. The successful sustainment of the British Army played a central role in enabling both regular and

irregular military operations to proceed against a series of French marshals over a six year period lamely led by King Joseph Napoleon.¹⁴ Up to the Dos de Mayo,¹⁵ Britain's sole peninsular ally had been Portugal. Dependant entirely upon Britain for her defense and gradual rebuilding of a credible military force, Portugal nonetheless made an effective ally in the Peninsular War, *with Lisbon serving as the Anglo-Portuguese COG*. Not only was Lisbon the main supply base and troop center for Wellington it was also center of the Portuguese professional and economic classes, served as the government center and capital of the Portuguese Regency [led by the British], was the training and billeting site of the greatest mass of the evolving Ordenanza [Portuguese troops] which became almost 1/3 of Wellington's peninsular army, as well as being the major port for the nation.¹⁶ With Cadiz's establishment as Spain's revolutionary center in February 1810 (displacing the recently disgraced and self disbanded Supreme Junta of Seville), the British government recognized the diplomatic, propaganda, and military value of continuing to have Spain as a second active ally in the Peninsula.¹⁷ Wellington correctly deduced his government's reaction and so spearheaded the emergency resourcing of Cadiz prior to receiving formal British government approval.¹⁸ By hastily cementing a partnership with the interim revolutionary government of Spain, Britain foresaw what the long term benefits of such an arrangement might yield.

Wellington's eventual success in the Peninsula was, in a large measure, only possible due to his relative freedom from the "tyranny of logistics" in comparison with his French counterparts. The principal reasons for this British victory rests with two distinctly related French weaknesses in the Iberian Peninsula: **logistics and sea power**.¹⁹ The allies could sustain and strengthen their two centers of gravity relatively easily, whereas the

French could not, or would not, adequately resource even one COG following Napoleon's departure in 1809.²⁰ The Peninsular War served as a source of strategic consumption for the French army.²¹ Over 300,000 imperial soldiers would be lost in the Peninsula, clearly a major impact on French manpower which adversely affected other theaters. Many scholars consider this significant loss of irreplaceable French combat power as an important contributing factor in Napoleon's defeat in Russia in 1812.²²

Did Wellington's early gamble in thinning his own slim assets in Lisbon to aid Cadiz play a central role in the ultimate victory of the allies in the Peninsula? Did this risky logistical and manpower transfer make possible the successful establishment of a complimentary center of gravity in Spain? By using Clausewitz's definitions and by careful analysis of the peninsular campaigns, it can be proved that the successful defense of Cadiz served as a complementary allied center of gravity in the Peninsular War and moreover, one that denied the French a strategic victory in the Iberian Peninsula.

SECTION ONE: "Money Well Spent..."

The English influence seems to dominate at Cadiz, and all indications are that they would lead the unhappy inhabitants of this city to defend themselves until they could chase off or destroy the Spanish and French squadron located in the port. It is said that they have landed several hundred artillery men and sailors from their fleet which have joined up with the priests and populace, as well as with the troops that the Duke of Albuquerque has rallied on the island of Leon.²³

*--Marshal Nicholas Soult, Duke of Dalmatia
Commander, Armee de Midi*

The introduction of French forces into the Iberian Peninsula in 1807 led by General Andre Junot may have been one of Napoleon's greatest mistakes. Following the Braganza royal family's pell mell flight to Brazil aboard British warships to escape Junot's advance, Napoleon succeeded in driving the last major British economic outpost off of western Europe save Sweden. With Portugal's occupation, Napoleon's continental system or economic war against England would be even more effective with the loss of another continental trade partner.²⁴ Spain belatedly realized that France now had substantial forces on both of her land borders, with inordinately large numbers of French replacements still marching through northern Spain. This two front strategic dilemma had ominous portents for Spain's immediate military and political future.²⁵

Napoleon's seizure of the Spanish throne in the months following Junot's triumph compounded Great Britain's hardship.²⁶ Previously, the old Spanish order had not been too effective a French ally. Since the destruction of the Spanish main fleet at Trafalgar in October 1805, Spain had generally been quiescent in naval and military affairs with the

exception of providing Napoleon a levy of her best troops for duty in the Baltic.

However, the specter of a rejuvenated Spain, under competent and motivated French military leadership was a cause for serious concern. The Royal Navy would be even more stressed in coping with the added weight of Spanish and Portuguese resources going towards the French naval establishment. Moreover, Napoleon's ongoing naval construction program continued to be a long term palpable threat. The increasing fatigue shouldered by Britain's blockade weary crews combined with the growing backlog of deferred ship maintenance, continued to be a serious drain on the British Admiralty and England's economy.²⁷

After regaining command of Britain's peninsular army following the furor over the Convention of Cintra and Sir John Moore's narrowly successful extraction of the British Army at La Corrona, Wellington made Lisbon his base for future operations.²⁸ Lisbon was a natural choice for the Anglo-Portuguese COG. Lisbon's superior natural harbor had enabled her to become the nation's leading economic center and national capital. Being surrounded on three sides by water she would be far more defensible by a numerically constrained force. Britain's Royal Navy patrolled the waters surrounding the city increasing its security while scores of merchantmen supplied the allies and populace with foodstuffs and materiel. The ability of the Royal Navy to not only extract or move the army when needed, but also to secure and transport the army's needs along the watery LOC from Great Britain, provided Wellington with a one sided flexibility that France could not duplicate.²⁹ Thus traditional British strengths like her navy and merchant fleets were quite able to resource and strengthen her Portuguese COG.

Many of the same characteristics that made Lisbon a viable Anglo Portuguese COG were also present in a somewhat similar vein at Cadiz. Previous to the French Andalusian offensive of 1810, Cadiz had been a liberal stronghold and growing middle class power in Spanish politics. After some turbulent political infighting the Central or Supreme Junta of Seville became the recognized de facto government of revolutionary Spain, while Madrid remained the traditional capital while under French domination.³⁰ Unlike revolutionary France, Spain was generally a nation of illiterate and conservative peasants with existing factions further dividing Spanish political unity in the absence of the royal family. Revolutionary Spain was never able to achieve a truly cohesive and representative government, resembling rather, a quarrelsome coalition forced together by necessity. However, having a British regent run Spain as they did with Portugal for the absent Portuguese king was not even remotely considered by the proud Spanish. The Supreme Junta's failure to justly rule and gain the confidence of all of Spain's unconquered provinces made a change of governments necessary if Spain were to succeed in ejecting the French from Spain. It was not the Spanish body politic that made the change but rather it was King Joseph's offensive that finally provided the impetus. The discredited and disgraced Supreme Junta fled Seville before the rapid and triumphant French advance, hastily abandoning the city while some of its more responsible delegates fled to Cadiz.³¹ Upon arrival, some of the delegates were incorporated into the local ruling Junta. A melange of the former Supreme Junta and the Cadiz Junta then formed a provisional revolutionary government eventually headed by a five man Regency to coordinate military operations and to politically consolidate the various revolutionary factions.³² Cadiz became the recognized defacto Spanish capital until mid 1814 with

foreign diplomats and ambassadors posted there until King Ferdinand's return to Madrid in 1814.³³

The geographic gifts that Cadiz enjoyed clearly played a prominent role in its successful defense for almost thirty months.³⁴ The city of Cadiz lies on the rocky tip of the Isla de Leon which is separated from the mainland by the Bay of Rota and the salty Santi Petri River. This water barrier around the Isla de Leon formed a formidable natural obstacle. The Santi Petri river was fully navigable by gunboats and small brigs and had numerous offshoots of canals and small inlets. On the river's mainland side were long stretches of extensive tidal marshes and salt pits which further enhanced the rivers defensive obstacle value.³⁵ The Punte Zuarrzo bridge was the only permanent structure which joined the island to the mainland. As British historian Sir William Fortescue succinctly noted, "The city of Cadiz is by nature one of the most inaccessible that is to be found in the world to a hostile force advancing by land only."³⁶

Much like Lisbon, Cadiz was a bustling port that played both a vital economic and naval role.³⁷ Cadiz was the primary Spanish port connecting the central government in Madrid with her revenue producing colonies in the Americas. For several centuries the merchants and townspeople had enjoyed a royal monopoly with all trade from America.³⁸ The first naval victory of the revolution had occurred in her harbor and Cadiz became the Spanish Navy's main naval base following the loss of El Ferrol to the French.³⁹ Cadiz did differ from much of Spain however. Due to its relatively large middle class population its demographics were not representative of Spain as a whole. It was more cosmopolitan than the majority of Spain and in some circles was passionately committed to modernization, albeit under Spanish auspices.

Further expounding on what comprised a GOG Clausewitz wrote, "In countries subject to domestic strife, the center of gravity is generally the capital."⁴⁰ In a closer examination, Cadiz meets this criteria. Prior to the Cadiz's ascension as the new governmental center in early 1810, Spain had been experiencing the worst throes of civil and domestic unrest since the reconquista. The usurpation of the Spanish throne by Napoleon and subsequent invasion exacerbated the already existing maelstrom of civil unrest and contrary social, economic and religious policies and divisions. The previous first minister, Manuel Godoy, in an attempt to modernize Spain's antiquated army and economy to meet the juggernaut of revolutionary and later Napoleonic France, had embarked on a series of unpopular reforms. Many of these reforms, while necessary and often desirable, had just the opposite rather than the intended effect. Traditional segments of Spanish society, mainly the nobility and the Catholic Church, as well as the privileged Basque provinces, resisted the changes since many of their prerogatives and privileges would be drastically curtailed. Godoy, already an unpopular figure due to his alleged adulterous affair with the queen, was unable to push through reforms due to his unpopularity, and in some cases, resistance from the king himself in order to placate his supporters and to control Godoy. Spanish disgust with the Bourbon's acquiescence in passing the throne to Joseph Napoleon also had a deleterious effect on political unity. Thus prior to the French invasion, traditional Spanish political and social structures had become rather more disjointed and impotent rather than cohesive and modernized. This significant political and social discord had made Spain extremely vulnerable to outside interference and was one of the principal reasons for Napoleon's decision to wrest Spain

from the Bourbons. Such inefficiency was not to be tolerated while Spain's resources could be better utilized and managed.⁴¹

The passions that were evoked on the *Dos de Mayo*, while powerful, were generally unfocused. The successful coordination of these energies into an effective and coordinated front by the remaining political institutions of Spain continued to elude the Spanish nation. After the *Dos de Mayo*, regional juntas attempted to consolidate power and build a consensus for fighting and governing. Many of these juntas found that the recent turmoil that was initiated by Godoy's well intentioned reforms hamstrung their ability to organize effective local governments. The eighteen months between the *Dos de Mayos* and the beginning of the siege of Cadiz saw only limited progress in centralizing and enhancing political control of the populace and war effort.⁴² Due to repeated Spanish military disasters in a series of ill conceived and poorly planned conventional battles, the Supreme Junta had grown increasingly unpopular.⁴³ The Supreme Junta's failure to honor its logistical promises to her English allies in combined operations in Spain and Portugal also contributed to its unpopularity. Increasingly, the disenchanted and disenfranchised called for the gathering of the Cortes, the Spanish equivalent of France's Estates General, and for the dismissal of the Supreme Junta.⁴⁴ The domestic and political discord that first began under Godoy, magnified by the inexperience and machinations of local Juntas and the Supreme Junta, adversely affected the new Spanish Regency recently formed in Cadiz. Until Ferdinand VII's return to Madrid and establishment of a post French reactionary regime, Cadiz functioned as the political, economic, social and professional center of unoccupied Spain. Even with the convening of the long awaited Cortes and the promulgation of the famous liberal Constitution of 1812, Cadiz and Spain

would continue to wrestle with political disunity well into the next century, setting the eventual conditions for the civil war of 1936.⁴⁵

Clausewitz expanded his definition of a COG to mean more than simply the bulk of the enemy's army. He recognized the importance of coalitions in waging war and that the strengths and resources of the other nation in the enemy's alliance needed to be recognized and targeted as well, "In small countries that rely on larger ones, it is usually the army of the protector." Cadiz clearly fits this expanded definition. It was British military forces that became 'the army of the protector.'⁴⁶ The rapid destruction of the regular Spanish armies under the nominal control of the Supreme Junta almost completed the military domination of Spain. What had been the "Army of Estremadura" under General Carlos Arizaga's command along the Sierra Morena mountain chain was swept aside and destroyed by Marshal Jean de Dieu Soult's *Armee du Midi* made up of some 60,000 French troops.⁴⁷ The only remaining regular Spanish formation of any consequence left in Andalusia was commanded by Duke Jose Albuquerque. Albuquerque's 12,000 men alone out of some 32,000 regular forces under Arizga were all that stood before Soult and Cadiz. Albuquerque recognized that his tattered but still cohesive force could not prevent the loss of Cordoba or defeat the French in the open despite the Supreme Junta's orders to stand and fight. He realized that he had but two choices; either disband his force and operate as partisans until conditions changed, or seek aid from an ally. In wisely choosing the latter Albuquerque force marched his army to the only readily defensible location left in Andalusia where he could link up with his maritime ally, Cadiz.⁴⁸ Surviving repeated skirmishes with French cavalry under General Marie-Victor Nicolas de Fay Latour-Marbourg on the forced march to Cadiz,

Albuquerque threw his exhausted troops onto the Isla de Leon and began preparing and manning its defensive works.⁴⁹

As the war neared Cadiz, chaos and indecision spread though the city and across the Isla de Leon. Fortunately for the inhabitants, they had received advanced notice of the French successes and had begun to improve their existing defenses. Cadiz, which had last fallen to the British over a century earlier, had invested both money and labor in upgrading her defenses in the interim. Although not completely equipped to withstand a long siege, Cadiz had considerable redoubts and fortifications along her harbor and the Santi Petri river.⁵⁰ The race to concentrate sufficient troops and resources to either defend or besiege the Isla de Leon had begun in earnest. Left to her own resources, Cadiz would most likely have not withstood a determined assault by Marshal Claude Perrin Victor's I Corps. However, the rapid response of the British CINC and other British officials provided the wherewithal for further resistance.

Albuquerque's four day lead on Victor enabled him to arrive two days ahead of the swift marching I Corps.⁵¹ Replacing the Captain-General of Andalusia, General Xaiver Castanos [who had been the recent appointee of the late and odious Supreme Junta] with the Duke of Albuquerque, the Junta of Cadiz ordered him to organize and command the defenses of the Isla de Leon.⁵² This was one of the first acts of the local Junta and Regency on a 'national governmental level.' Albuquerque's reputation as a legitimate soldier and now darling of Cadiz made him not only popular but also potentially dangerous to the Regency and local Junta. "Albuquerque was received on the island as well as Cadiz as a savior, and indeed, Spain and Europe owe him very much."⁵³ The political honeymoon between the Regency, the local Cadiz Junta, and the new

Captain General proved to be short lived. Albuquerque soon found himself promoted out of command and sent to Great Britain as the Spanish Ambassador to the court of St. James because of his popularity.⁵⁴ Friction between the new liberal Regency and her appointed military commanders would last until its dissolution, with Albuquerque's sacking being merely the first of many.

The 12,000 men that Albuquerque brought to Cadiz, even with local augmentation, would be insufficient to stop a determined Marshal Victor. Significant aid and resources must come from Great Britain if Cadiz were to hold out.⁵⁵ However, the Spanish were understandably reluctant to admit a British garrison onto the island. In light of the past several centuries Great Britain had been one of Spain's bitterest adversaries and up until two years earlier Cadiz had been savagely preyed upon by the British fleet.⁵⁶ Distrust between the two allies was based not only on past animosities, but also on current political realities. Spanish fears over the possible loss of her overseas colonies to a growing British mercantile threat was well founded. Britain had long coveted Spain's markets in the new world where her cheaper manufactured goods propelled by her desperate need for specie made the acquisition or access to Spanish colonies an important foreign policy goal and hence very real threat to Spain. A threat that was especially vexing to the merchant class of Cadiz. Wellington's army had been originally bound for South America and not for the Iberian Peninsula. Spanish concerns were clearly legitimate.⁵⁷

Britain, on the other hand, believed that Spain was not doing all it could for the war effort. Repeated promises of logistical support for Wellington's army went unfulfilled while the Supreme Junta continually embarked on foolhardy military schemes

which frittered away British aid and any real hope of a successful combined operation. Contrary Spanish politics and fears that should a British force be allowed to garrison the Isla de Leon then another Gibraltar would pockmark Spain's southern coast was widespread.⁵⁸ Shortly after the *Dos de Mayo* a British brigade was refused entry onto the Isla de Leon and despite repeated British requests to position a force on the island, the local Junta refused.⁵⁹ However, Soult's success in destroying Arizaga's army coupled with the sight of Victor's corps across the Santi Petri convinced even the most passionate Spanish nationalist on the Isla de Leon that without British military forces and succor, capitulation was only a short time away.⁶⁰ Fortunately, Great Britain had land forces relatively nearby. Both Gibraltar and Lisbon held the answer to the Junta's prayer, but would it be in time?

Cadiz's strategic importance had been readily apparent to Britain for some time. Being an island made Cadiz accessible to the British fleet. Two way communications would be relatively rapid vis-à-vis the Royal Navy thereby enhancing coordination and making the execution of peninsular policy simpler. Due to Cadiz's location it was highly practicable choice as a staging base for future offensive operations in southern and western Spain. Moreover, garrison rights on the Isla de Leon offered Wellington a suitable secondary COG site for his army should they be forced to evacuate Lisbon. These reasons, and pressure from his eldest brother, Marquis Richard Wellesley, the Foreign Minister, were foremost in Wellington's mind when word reached him that Soult had run roughshod over Andalusia and that all that stood between Cadiz and the French held mainland was a few gunboats and Albuquerque's spent force. If aid did not arrive soon, then Cadiz too would be lost.⁶¹

The loss of Andalusia made Wellington's strategic situation more difficult. His southern flank along the Portuguese border was now wide open to French incursion. The only bright spot in a rather dismal strategic picture was the fact that now a French corps was concentrated around Cadiz and not available for use against Wellington's army. Following a petition for military assistance and a formal request for a British garrison to defend the Isla de Leon, Britain quickly responded to the call for help. Major General Campbell, the local commander of Her Majesty's forces in Gibraltar, had been prepared to send troops to nearby Cuentra in North Africa to garrison it against the French. Thus he had already assembled the necessary manpower and watercraft for an expedition and was well positioned to answer the Spanish plea for help. Aiding Cadiz would also help to protect Gibraltar.⁶² The French would have to menace both installation concurrently if they wanted to deny them the advantage of interior lines made possible by robust British sea power. The opening of Cadiz to the British was the next step in the stormy maturation of a peninsular coalition relationship between the two petulant allies.⁶³ Yet the potential benefits garnered by such a coalition, and the investment in sustainment of Cadiz as the Anglo-Spanish COG, far outweighed the heavy and years long investments in diplomacy, money, and military wherewithal.

SECTION TWO: "Men, Material, and Money..."

*"War is not an independent phenomenon, but the continuation of politics by different means. Consequently, the main lines of every major strategic plan are largely political in nature and their political character increases the more the plan encompasses the entire war and the entire state. The plan for the war results directly from the political conditions of the two belligerent states, as well as from their relations to other powers. According to this point of view, there can be no question of a purely military evaluation of a great strategic issue, nor of a purely military scheme to solve it."*⁶⁴

--Clausewitz, 22 December 1827

The celerity of the French invasion and the rapid dismemberment of the Spanish Army in Andalusia put Britain in a quandary. Should she concentrate her finite assets in protecting the fledgling army under Wellington in the vulnerable capital of Portugal to maintain a conventional threat to France, or should Britain press to assist the Spanish Government (in whatever form it would eventually take) and reallocate slim military assets in a gamble which might offer a far greater return for her coalition investments? While such a question would eventually be hotly debated in London's White Hall, it was the newly appointed Foreign Minister of the Perceval Ministry, Marquess Richard Wellesley, Wellington's determined elder brother, who had little doubt what the best course of action the British Government should undertake.⁶⁵ The Marquess wanted to protect Portugal while concurrently aiding the new Spanish government in Cadiz in the hope that the new government might make a more effective ally in the war against France.⁶⁶ If British military and financial aid were unselfishly given, and if the sincere friendship that Britain offered was properly recognized without raising undue suspicion

and Anglophobia, then such a solid front would go a long way in cementing a functional alliance against the French.⁶⁷

The new Regency, now led by General Castaños, requested from Wellington, “a body of English troops to assist in it’s defense.”⁶⁸ The Iron Duke understood the strategic importance of holding Cadiz and securing the seat of the new Spanish government. In consequence he immediately ordered the necessary preparations to dispatch a reinforced brigade to sail to the Isla de Leon. This was not a simple decision. Already Wellington was facing an increase in French pressure after his costly and controversial victory at Talavera. Deep in the process of upgrading the *Ordinanza* of Portugal and constructing the Lines of Torres Vedres Wellington continued to be chronically short of manpower and equipment. With the southern approaches to Portugal now unsecured, any diversion of manpower could have a disastrous impact on his own fragile position.

Marshal Soult’s *Armee de Midi* broke through the Sierra Morena with four corps suffering very light losses. The I Corps was under Marshal Claude Perrin Victor with a mission to destroy the left flank of the Spanish Army while the II Corps Commander under General Jean Louis Reynier was principally responsible to observe the Portuguese frontier and stop any British attempts at helping the Spanish. The III Corps under General Horace Francois Sebastiani along with the V Corps led by Marshal Edouard Adolphe Mortier was to destroy all Spanish armies in Andalusia and pacify the countryside. Each of these corps commanders played a role in crushing the 170 mile Spanish defensive line along the Sierra Morena. Within twenty days the bulk of Soult’s army was near Seville, shattering and scattering the ill commanded Spanish forces before it and capturing numerous towns and cannon. King Joseph ordered an operational

'pause' near Seville in order to consolidate his gains. This pause created a delay of several days for Victor's advance to Cadiz. This time buffer gave the Spanish the opportunity to consolidate and march to Cadiz.⁶⁹

Fortunately for Wellington, Major General William Stewart was already enroute to Lisbon with 3,000 fresh troops from Spithead and could easily be diverted to Cadiz to answer the request of the new Regency for military aid.⁷⁰ Wellington ordered Stewart to move to Cadiz as soon as he had all in readiness and to provide for a defense of the Isla de Leon. Just as Wellington had been fortunate in having a fresh body of troops arrive from Britain, he was just as favored in having an exceptional naval counterpart in the person of Admiral George Cranfield Berkeley in being able to shift his logistics and manpower assets to the other COG.⁷¹ Berkeley and Wellington would develop a special relationship, one that could be considered a model of interservice cooperation for subsequent joint operations.⁷² The Royal Navy would provide extraordinary service for the allies over the next two years in defending Cadiz and supplying the city with foodstuffs, naval stores, and a plethora of other logistical needs while ferrying large detachments of troops and supplies for the guerrillas. It was the Royal Navy which enabled Wellington to sustain his COG where his opponents could not, and gave the important advantage of interior lines to the numerically inferior allies despite being on the periphery of the Iberian Peninsula.⁷³

As Stewart prepared his command for the change in mission, the Royal Navy too had to shift its already stretched assets to supply and assist two separate British operations which were separated by a minimum of four days of good sailing weather.⁷⁴ The Royal Navy was given a very important mission on top of the already great burden

they carried in supporting the Peninsular War: if required they had to be prepared to evacuate Wellington's army should it become necessary. In a 'most secret dispatch' dated 16 February 1810, Admiral Berkeley received the startling order for the need to plan for a second evacuation of the British Army in light of a renewed and successful French invasion of Portugal, reminiscent of Sir John Moore's escapade of 1809. "The pressures of circumstances would have already induced Lord Viscount Wellington to resolve on the immediate evacuation of Portugal...and of any necessity that may exist for...assisting in the operation necessary towards the safe embarkment of his Lordship's Army."⁷⁵

Clearly, the British view of the military situation in the Peninsula during the first quarter of 1810 was realistically pessimistic.⁷⁶ This view was one that was colored by the French reinforcements which flowed past Bayonne and increasingly found their way to the frontier of Portugal and the recent destruction of Spain's largest army in Andalusia.⁷⁷ Future prospects for an allied Spring offensive were markedly dimmed for the foreseeable future.⁷⁸ Yet, the combined garrisoning of Cadiz could offer the allies two important advantages; a relatively secure base of operations deep in the enemy's rear that was economically and politically connected to the Spanish colonies in the Americas; and two, Cadiz could be readily supplied and partially protected by the Royal Navy in an *Economy of Force* role. With Joseph's invasion of Andalusia, strategic consumption became a reality for the conquering French, resulting in over extension and dilution of available combat power for potential offensive operations against Wellington.

The British were quick to marshal forces on behalf of the new Spanish government. British Rear-Admiral Richard Purvis, commanding a detachment at Cadiz

under Vice-Admiral Lord Cuthbert Collingwood's Mediterranean command, immediately dispatched ships to Lisbon and Gibraltar to ferry troops, fortuitously anticipating Wellington decision to transfer troops and materiel to Cadiz. Meanwhile the bulk of Victor's corps had arrived in the vicinity of the Isla de Leon and began preparations for crossing the Santi Petri River and then on to Cadiz. It had become a race between the French and the British to concentrate superior forces in the vicinity. Albuquerque's strained command was short cannon, ammunition, all manner of carts and horses, and other necessary equipment. Clearly, logistical support and a need for additional manpower were foremost not only on Spanish commander's mind, but on the new Regency and the British envoy as well.⁷⁹

Displaying keen foresight, Wellington understood that although he was siphoning off his own desperately needed replacements, the successful garrisoning of Cadiz by British forces was of major importance in furthering the attainment of England's overall strategy.⁸⁰ Wellington's guidance to General Stewart was that command of British troops must not be relegated to Spanish officers and that the Spanish government must honor its logistical commitments to supply the English force in the defense of the Isla de Leon. They must, "provision the men as they have a right to expect in the service of His Majesty."⁸¹ Stewart sailed from Lisbon on 7 February 1810 with his staff aboard the HMS Rota and arrived four days later to a very popular welcome.⁸² He was met by Brigadier General William Bowes from Gibraltar whom had already posted his troops on the western side of the Isla, as well as the Duke of Albuquerque.⁸³ Lieutenant Wright Knox, part of Stewart's command, noted in a letter to his brother on 13 February 1810 on

his fears of meeting Victor's troops, "...from all accounts, we will have fire day and night until they are either driven away or we destroyed."⁸⁴

The immediate tactical situation was not as desperate as young Lieutenant Knox's comments indicated but was nonetheless, quite serious. To adequately defend the island from attack Wellington earlier estimated that it would take upwards of 15,000 men, supported by the Royal Navy, to repel a determined assault. A strong naval force, rich in gunboats and small craft, would have to play a pivotal role in patrolling the shallow waters around the Isla de Leon. A vigorous naval presence was required until an adequate land forces could be formed into an semi-independent and partially self sufficient command to protect the island. Consequently the British Admiralty hastily agreed to reinforce the Cadiz squadron, dangerously stripping Lisbon, Gibraltar, as well as ports in Ireland, for duty at Cadiz. In a dispatch to Admiral Berkeley on 15 February, the Admiralty ordered additional ships to Cadiz, to assist in stopping a probable French land assault, but to also safeguard it from a possible sortie from the French fleet at Toulon.⁸⁵ If the French fleet were to gain local naval superiority for even a few hours it would enable the I Corps to make a forced crossing the Santi Petri river, allowing Victor to rapidly overrun the Isla de Leon. The British fleet would then be forced to evacuate what allied forces she could and abandon the growing stockpile of supplies. The value and importance of holding Cadiz was well understood by both Wellington and the Admiralty and all necessary steps were taken to preclude its loss.

Wellington's immediate decision to reinforce the new Spanish capital did much to raise the morale of the besieged Spaniards. On 11 February the remainder of Stewart's 2,146 men landed on the Isla de Leon amidst a heartfelt welcome, bringing total British

forces to almost 4,500.⁸⁶ Britain's interim envoy to the new Spanish government wrote to Wellington, "the timely succor which you have sent will both aid Cadiz's defense and give the Spanish an opportunity to create a force of a very different description."⁸⁷ The British Ambassador to Portugal offered a detachment of Portuguese infantry for duty at Cadiz, recognizing the importance at holding the other allied capital and aiding Wellington with his manpower crisis. In consequence the 20th Portuguese Cacadores joined Stewart's force and were also favorably welcomed by the Spanish populace.⁸⁸

Allied naval and land forces continued to flock to Cadiz in order to shore up the island's defenses.⁸⁹ With the lag in communications brought about by a change in the prevailing seasonal winds between the British Isles and Iberia, the military situation was still unclear to the Admiralty and War Office in early February 1810 and caution remained the order of the day.⁹⁰ Despite the uncertainty of the tactical situation reinforcements continued to arrive in Cadiz. By 20 February over 11,200 allied soldiers and sufficient stores had been gathered at Cadiz, yet still more troops were required to properly defend the island.⁹¹ The hasty reinforcement ordered by Wellington and executed by the Royal Navy continued until mid May when over 18,000 allied soldiers were stationed on the Isla de Leon. Wellington was hard pressed to locate more reinforcements for the Cadiz garrison or even for himself. Ultimately, General Stewart was obliged to appeal to Robert Banks Jenkins, Lord Liverpool, for additional men from Britain since Wellington could provide no more. The British government experienced an increasingly difficult time in filling the personnel requirements of the troop short field command. Fagging enthusiasm for the war in Britain impacted on military expansion. Neither recruiting nor impressment could keep pace with the growing manpower needs of

both the army and navy. There was no ready pool of reserves that could be tapped for service in the Peninsula. Unlike France and later Prussia, Britain never organized a draft to fill her painful military vacancies. The challenge of finding sufficient men for the British Army kept the War Office very busy until Napoleon's exile and end of the American War of 1812. The quandary of finding sufficient manpower for military service was never truly solved by the British in the 19th century, a relapse would again occur during the Crimean War.

Stewart made an initial survey of the island and its defenses and found serious shortfalls at multiple points. Discovering that the Spanish troops along the key approach of the Punte Zuarrzo bridge were lacking in readiness, manpower, and supplies, Stewart received permission to move the 1st Battalion of the 79th Foot to help cover the vulnerable sector. Additionally he placed two batteries of Royal Artillery alongside the existing Spanish batteries that daily exchanged volleys with Victor's gunners across the Santi Petri River and the Matagorda straits.⁹² As Stewart's soldiers busily constructed defensive positions and strengthened obstacles, more Spanish forces were continuously landed on the island by the Royal Navy along with additional supplies from Wellington.⁹³ Fortunately for the allies, the British Ordnance Board accelerated the forward movement supplies on Wellington's request and shipped all available arms and ammunition to equip the influx of allied soldiers.⁹⁴ Wellington rerouted supplies and weapons onward to Cadiz that were originally bound for his army to outfit the reforming Spanish ranks and to build up a suitable depot stock pile for the growing number of British troops. A typical example of such logistical 'surging' can be seen by the actions of one of Wellington's ersatz logisticians. Royal Artillery Officer, Colonel Harris Fisher, supervising the

accountability and issue of artillery quartermaster stores for the British in Lisbon's busy port, wrote to Wellington, "As there are now lying in the Tagus 6 ships containing heavy ordnance, viz. Five 24 pounders and five 12 pounders each with a considerable portion of spherical case shot in each, it has occurred to me that this ration of ammunition might be eminently useful at Cadiz, under which idea I have ventured to suggest it to your Lordship."⁹⁵ Wellington took Fisher's advice and the six ship convoy departed Lisbon for Cadiz on 10 February 1810. A plethora of like correspondence amply illustrates the necessary coordination and risk assessments made by Wellington and his staff in the race to reinforce Cadiz. A robust British fleet commanded by Admiral Charles Berkeley made the fulfillment such a difficult logistical challenge possible. Wellington's careful analysis and setting of logistical priorities enhanced the rapid infusion of men and materiel to reinforce and supply the other COG making possible Cadiz's survival.⁹⁶

The British occupation of the Isla de Leon was not smoothly executed once admission to the island was gained. Stewart and his troops experienced some difficulty in obtaining adequate housing and in making local purchases for fresh rations. Cadiz had already absorbed a large number of refugees and the influx of displaced Spanish soldiers and governmental officials filled the city to capacity. This housing crisis and lack of moderately priced foodstuffs continued to worsen as the siege progressed, in fact it would become one of the principal sources of friction between the Spanish military and their British counterparts during the siege of Cadiz.⁹⁷

In Stewart's initial military reconnaissance of the island he was surprised to discover that the Spanish Army and British Royal Navy had abandoned the tactically crucial mainland fort of Matagorda after failing to destroy some of its ramparts. Fort

Matagorda controlled half of the entrance into Cadiz's inner bay and lay only 1,200 feet from the allied fort of Puntales on the Isla de Leon.⁹⁸ Admiral Purvis had ordered Fort Matagorda destroyed and its artillery carried off on 2 February with the two largest guns which could not be moved were first spiked then rolled into the muddy scarp in order to stymie any attempted use by the enemy.⁹⁹ However, the fort was not completely destroyed and its possession would be of immediate tactical value to the French, enabling them to greatly inhibit the flow of allied naval traffic in the crowded harbor with their superior land based artillery.¹⁰⁰ Stewart immediately recognized the importance of retaking and occupying the fort. He collaborated with the Royal Navy to provide assistance in landing a "storming detachment" of sailors and soldiers to take back the abandoned post.¹⁰¹ Admiral Purvis concurred and provided naval vessels and sailors for Stewart's operation. Captain Archibald McLean of the 94th Foot, commanding a joint force under the cover of darkness and rain, retook the fort and emplaced artillery on 22 February 1810.¹⁰² McLean's men occupied Fort Matagorda and fought off numerous French attacks until 22 April when it was ultimately recaptured by Victor's troops in a daring surprise attack.¹⁰³ The new French works at Matagorda, combined with the occupation of nearby Fort Luis, gave Victor an important edge in firepower in the upper bay. The two forts put out a heavy volume of fire against allied naval craft, causing Admiral Purvis and Spanish Admiral Ricardo Valdes to move their principal anchorage's into the more choppy waters of the outer bay. This realignment of ships somewhat hamstrung allied harbor operations and commerce in the bay, contributing to a slowdown in shipping and embarkment.¹⁰⁴

The difficulty of garrisoning and securing the almost twenty-five miles of shoreline surrounding the bay of Cadiz was difficult for the relatively weak I Corps.¹⁰⁵ Conversely, the rest of Joseph's army met little resistance in the consolidation of Andalusia and were materially better off than Victor's troops. Except for the Isla de Leon, only the recently resupplied fortress of Badajoz had resisted the sweeping French tide that descended from Madrid and powerfully sluiced its way through the Sierra Morena.¹⁰⁶ This rapid French success in conquering Andalusia engendered some logistical difficulties. The quandary at being the end of a very long line of communication at the extreme southern coast of Spain, separated by five major rivers and mountain chains that were bisected by only a few marginal roads, was beginning to be felt by Victor and Soult.¹⁰⁷ General Jean-Joseph Paul Augustin Dessolle's entire Madrid division was being used to police and protect the vulnerable French LOC which snaked from Madrid, through the pass of Despena Perros, to Seville and thence onwards to Cadiz. Exacerbating the difficulties of an already long LOC was the increase of Spanish guerilla activity especially in the nearby Ronda mountains, a sub-chain of the rugged Sierra Nevada. Repeated raids and ambushes compounded the difficulties of the already awkward task of supplying the disbursed French army. The foothills of this range reached all the way to Gibraltar, allowing guerilla groups in the Ronda mountains to easily draw aid from the British garrison when French observation troops were drawn away by coordinated raids.¹⁰⁸ Soult was painfully aware that the longer the French took to capture the Isla de Leon, the stronger the allies would correspondingly become. The lack of small watercraft in the immediate vicinity precluded an amphibious assault and without naval support from Toulon, any half measure waterborne attack would be simply

repulsed by the allied fleet. The French tactical stalemate seemed unsolvable without naval support. However, if the stalemate could not be broken by force of arms, perhaps it might be breached by diplomacy.

Capitalizing on the overwhelming string of victories in Andalusia and the surrender of all major towns and cities, Soult hoped that diplomatic pressure might succeed where Victor's troops could not. In correspondence with the Duke of Albuquerque, Soult sought the surrender of Cadiz with the promise of complete immunity for all Spanish soldiers and sailors, government officials and clergy, promising that they would earn the gratification of King Joseph who only wished to be reunited with 'his people.'¹⁰⁹ The Spanish government, along with Albuquerque, refused to surrender. Albuquerque wrote to Soult, "The faithful Spanish of Ferdinand VII will not lay down their arms until they have regained their rights."¹¹⁰ Despite several follow on offers and requests for impartial negotiations, the Spanish were adamant in confounding Victor, even in light of the efforts of Soult to divide the tenuous coalition along inflammatory nationalist lines.¹¹¹ Albuquerque responded to Soult slights against his allies, "The English, have no other intention than of helping us. The defenders of Cadiz are Spaniards, and by their side stand their allies – the English and the Portuguese."¹¹² In failing to get to Cadiz to surrender Soult realized that a long, costly siege was the only way to complete the conquest of Andalusia. He candidly wrote to Marshal Louis Alexandre Berthier (Napoleon's Chief of Staff), "...therefore, the indication is that the operation will be a long one, and only force alone can terminate this conquest."¹¹³

Over the course of the next several weeks the two sides contented themselves to exchanging periodic artillery volleys and increasing troop strength.¹¹⁴ The French troops

near Cadiz were suffering from a lack of food, supplies, ammunition, and had not been paid in months. The I Corps was getting materially weaker while the allies were growing correspondingly stronger. A frustrated Victor wrote to Soult,

... What will hinder us the most here is a shortage of fodder and grain for the horses. It is incredible that none exists in this area within a 40 mile radius, and that we can only obtain some by the care or general order of the Army...I must take this occasion to say that the chief ordnance officer does very little to tend to this essential part of his duty and that he seems to take absolutely no interest in seeing that the horses of the teams and of the officers of the I Corps are taken care of. For the good of the service to His Majesty and to the Marshal, I beg Your Excellency to give positive orders to the ordnance officer of the Army of Spain to establish sufficient stores and supplies at Xeres, or rather at San Lucar by the Guadalquivir, so that we can be in a position to support our forces in front of Cadiz. Otherwise, our zeal and goodwill will mount to nothing. It is obvious that the service of the horses of the artillery in these circumstances is the most essential, and if we cannot provide for their subsistence, this service cannot be continued. I appeal, in this regard, to the solicitude of Your Excellency.¹¹⁵

Victor's vexation increased as the siege wore on. Sebastiani's efforts at imposing order on the unruly sections of eastern Andalusia and Granada yielded increased revenues for Joseph's cash strapped treasury (as well as personal wealth for himself) but also increased the animosity of the Andalusians, who began to hide supplies and foodstuffs from Victor's logisticians.¹¹⁶ The lack of sufficient fodder required Victor to move his horses to locations where there was sufficient forage and grain, which was almost always away from the coastline of Cadiz. Another reason for moving the cavalry towards Mediona-Sidona and Vejer near the Ronda mountains was to stem the increasingly bold attacks from the *partitadas*. Since the siege mainly required the use of the infantry, engineers, and artillery, the cavalry arm had relatively little to do in a static posture and was best suited for this endless mission.¹¹⁷ Victor's frustration at the shortage of supplies

increased so much he jumped the chain of command and appealed directly to King Joseph for logistical support, clearly maligning his superior, Marshal Soult in the process.¹¹⁸ Joseph could do little to help him and vaguely directed Soult to see to the army's needs. The impact on the rapid advance through Andalusia was chiefly borne by Victor's men. The leash which attached the 'French dogs of war' to Madrid was stretched taut, and without the benefit of seapower to ease the strain, the prospect of the next meal for Victor's troops remained uncertain.

The British War Office understood that although the Duke of Wellington was the commander of all British forces in the Peninsula except for Gibraltar, he could not properly supervise the defense of the other allied capital without putting Lisbon in jeopardy. In consequence the British government decided to post one of its most able senior officers to command the growing British garrison at Cadiz. Sir Thomas Graham, Lord Lyndoch, was selected for this important coalition post. His prior service as British liaison officer to both Russia and Austria and active campaigning with Sir John Moore in the Peninsula, and also participating in the recent abortive Walchern expedition made him one of the most experienced and seasoned officers extant in the rather limited British senior officer inventory.¹¹⁹ His fluency in several languages coupled with this excellent soldierly reputation, soundly endorsed by Wellington and the Prince Regent, made his selection a shrewd one.¹²⁰ Graham's posting was fortuitous for the alliance. He had already served in the Iberian Peninsula and had personally experienced the difficulties associated in working with the Spanish Army. He was given the local rank of Lieutenant General and was appointed as Wellington's second in command, in spite of being separated from the Army of Portugal by some 400 miles.¹²¹ Graham arrived on 24 March

and was warmly welcomed by the Spanish Regency.¹²² Graham would command the British troops at Cadiz until July 1811, winning the important battle of Barossa against Victor and capturing the first eagle ever lost by a French force.¹²³ Enduring considerable difficulties with the Spanish government at Cadiz and personal slights by his Spanish counterpart, Graham's resourceful leadership clearly played a major role in the successful defense of the Isla de Leon.¹²⁴ The importance of his post was such that he was appointed as Wellington's second in command but due to coalition considerations in maintaining the other Peninsular COG, he was to also report directly to Sir David Dundas, the British Commander in Chief of the United Kingdom, on his operations.

As adept as the British were in choosing a gifted and capable commander for Cadiz they were equally skilled in selecting a consummate diplomat and intelligent ambassador in the form of Henry Wellesley, younger brother of both Wellington and the Foreign Secretary, Richard Wellesley.¹²⁵ The Marquess Richard Wellesley was the chief architect of British Peninsular Policy and with his brother Arthur in charge of Peninsular military operations, combined with the talents of his other highly capable younger brother as Ambassador to Spain, the final leg of the "Wellesley Triad" was in place. Although this arrangement smacked of nepotism, it was actually highly beneficial to the British government. All of the Wellesleys were exceptional men. Due to his family connections Henry Wellesley could be even more effective in dealing with the Spanish government knowing he enjoyed both the Foreign Minister's and Peninsular CINC's solid backing in all matters.¹²⁶ Henry Wellesley served as the British Ambassador to Spain for the remainder of the war, carefully coordinating British diplomatic maneuvers with Wellington's military movements, thereby retaining a solid and consistent civil-military

front with her Peninsular allies.¹²⁷ It would be Henry Wellesley who would control the purse string of British monetary and military aid to the Regency and Cortes and be the iron fisted yet flexible executor of brother Richard's strategy. As essential as Henry Wellesley's contribution was, even more important was Wellington's rapid logistical response to support of the tenuous Anglo-Spanish COG which ultimately set the conditions for the successful fruition of British strategy in the Peninsular War.

SECTION THREE: "Conclusion"

*I had no knowledge of the state of affairs in Spain until three or four days previous to my arrival to this place...The force you have sent here has saved the place: and I have no doubt that if it continues to hold out, it will be owing to the confidence of the inhabitants in the English troops...I hope when they hear in England of British troops having been admitted into this place they will send us a few more regiments, for Cadiz must depend for its defense upon the British and upon the British alone. We know nothing of the rest of Spain, excepting what we hear from Lisbon.*¹²⁸

--Henry Wellesley to the Duke of Wellington, 9 March 1810

*...the raising of the siege of Cadiz...is not the least important consequence of the singular victory of Salamanca...I can give but a faint idea of the general joy which this event has occasioned among the inhabitants of this place who have been thus released from a siege of two and a half years duration.*¹²⁹

--Henry Wellesley to Lord Castlereagh, 26 August 1812

Wellington's hasty investment in troops and supplies to reinforce Cadiz paid handsome dividends for the allied cause. The importance of maintaining Spain as an active ally in the Peninsular War, even at prohibitive financial cost, was clearly obvious. Wellington's own military predicament in early 1810 was precarious and the possibility of using Cadiz as a securable second COG, should he be forced from Lisbon, made its retention an important military and diplomatic goal. Wellington candidly wrote to Graham, "In the event of my being obliged to evacuate Portugal with the British Army, you are probably aware, that I have received instructions from His Majesty's Ministers to carry it to Cadiz."¹³⁰ Lord Liverpool, understandably concerned about the plausible possibility of losing England's only army, prompted him to write Wellington,

...I should appraise you, however, that a very considerable degree of alarm exists in this country respecting the safety for the British Army in

Portugal; and as it is always some advantage to know on a question of doubtful policy on which side it may be best to err, I have no difficulty in stating that, under all circumstances, you would rather be excused for bringing away the army a little too soon than, by remaining in Portugal a little too long...¹³¹

Fortunately for Wellington, the growing tensions between Napoleon and Czar Alexander would soon cause the French to start drawing away some of their best units for use in the abortive invasion of Russia. Wellington's scorched earth tactics, use of the Torres Vedres, his own excellent generalship, the debilitating effects of French strategic consumption, and the constant support of the Royal Navy all wore down a succession of talented Marshals who could not expect full support from their busy emperor nor the resources to pacify all of Iberia.

The French martial tide which had surged so powerfully from the headwaters north of the Sierra Morena in early 1810 were now receding from Andalusia in the Franco military twilight of 1812. Wellington's convincing victory at Salamanca over an overly confident Marshal Auguste Frederic Marmont allowed him to finally wrest control over western and southern Spain from King Joseph.¹³² Soult realized that with the strong conventional English army controlling the center of Spain, then his army would be cut off in Andalusia from the rest of French controlled Spain. However, if reinforced he could invade southern Portugal and maneuver to a position to sever Wellington's LOC and then possibly defeat him on less favorable ground. If Soult were successful, Wellington would be forced to withdraw to Lisbon and Joseph's kingdom would be saved.¹³³ Joseph vetoed the plan and ordered the aggressive Soult to march north and link up with the rest of Joseph's forces.¹³⁴ Thus was Cadiz relieved after two and a half years of French investment.¹³⁵ Even after the retreat of Soult's forces, Wellington took no chances on

losing the city should the French tide rise again. Cadiz was too important to leave lightly defended. He directed the new British commander, General Roger Cooke who followed Sir Thomas Graham, to continue to refine defensive works and be ready to receive additional troops should it become necessary in the event of military reversals to have Cadiz as a haven for the British Army.¹³⁶

The successful defense of the Anglo-Spanish COG was due to several factors. *Foremost was Wellington's adept and timely resupply and reinforcement of the Isla de Leon* which enabled the infant Spanish government to form, function, raise conventional armies, coordinate guerrilla actions, and ultimately to promulgate the important reform Constitution of 1812. Henry Wellesley corroborated the importance of Wellington's achievement in a letter to his brother, "the force you sent here has saved the place...But such a set of wretches as the Spanish troops I have never yet beheld...after seeing the Spanish troops I despair of anything being done in Spain."¹³⁷ The British defended and supported haven for the Spanish government gave Spain a framework for further resistance against the French installed king and the opportunity of reestablishing a fractured military and naval establishment. Moreover, Cadiz's survival enabled Spain to maintain the important linkage with her American colonies, albeit under less than desirable circumstances.

Secondly, the circumstances of Cadiz's geography and long history as a sea port contributed to her survival. It was the joint and combined nature of the defense that enabled Cadiz to withstand the I Corps for so long. The generous naval assistance rendered by the Royal Navy in stores, nautical equipment and supplies, and most especially, the incessant patrolling of the bay and Santi Petri provided vital support for

the land based defenders that only sea power could apply.¹³⁸ “Your Highness has noticed in all my reports that I am convinced that it is impossible to take Cadiz without the Navy” wrote Soult in a letter to Berthier, “and we cannot penetrate the island of Leon without a sufficient number of landings.”¹³⁹

Sea power played a pivotal role in safeguarding the infant Spanish capital as it did in Lisbon, and even London. Just as Britain’s “walls of oak” prevented the Grande Armee at Boulogne from crossing the narrow English Channel and conquering an ‘army poor Britain’, the Royal Navy prevented Victor and Soult from concluding the conquest of Andalusia.¹⁴⁰ The timely combined naval raids conducted by the allies against a growing French small boat fleet that Victor and Soult were building on the mainland side of the bay of Cadiz prevented the French from attempting an amphibious assault. Frequent spoiling attacks against Victor’s troops by mixed British forces and demonstrations and raids by small Spanish fleets frittered away Victor’s stores and robbed him of the initiative.¹⁴¹

The endless convoys of wheat from the United States of America provided the necessary staples for both the Allied armies in Cadiz and her citizens, and moreover, for Wellington’s own Army of Portugal.¹⁴² (See Appendix B). Cut off from all land traffic and commerce, Cadiz had to rely exclusively on neutral and allied merchant fleets for all food and supplies. Correspondingly, the I Corps was forced to depend on uncertain local foraging and occasional shipments of grain and supplies from far away Madrid. The I Corps could never approach the level of robust logistics that the allies enjoyed although only separated by a few hundred yards at some points.

The amount of monetary aid given by Britain to her penurious ally was considerable. In a later treasury examination in 1829 it was disclosed that Britain had provided over fifty-four million pounds for Peninsular military operations and financial aid. Over half this amount went to Cadiz.¹⁴³ Henry Wellesley used the desperate need for British monies that the Spanish government required to push for reform of the Spanish military in order to make it more effective in the field with his brother's forces. A combination of flattery and hard bargaining eventually enabled the redoubtable Wellesley to win concessions from the Spanish.

Britain not only provided a large financial indemnity to Spain, but also supplied a large military presence for the defense of the Isla de Leon. British land forces numbered at times almost 16,000 troops, a considerable investment in available land power given that Wellington had only 50,000 British troops at his disposal.¹⁴⁴ Britain too supplied and equipped a Spanish field army of almost 30,000 men on the Isla de Leon and set up a training academy under British officers to train Spanish troops and junior leaders.¹⁴⁵ British officers were also given commands of Spanish divisions that were partially paid for by Great Britain.¹⁴⁶ Eventually the Duke of Wellington would be appointed as Commander in Chief of Spain's armies, completing one of Britain's long standing foreign policy goals and adding additional order on what had been characterized as inefficient and fruitless Spanish military operations.

Several French mistakes contributed to the successful allied defense of the Isla de Leon. A significant mistake was made by Marshal Soult, who convinced King Joseph that Cadiz would surrender as promptly as Jaen, Seville, and Cordoba, and that the use of the I Corps as an honor guard for the King's entrance into Seville was more important

than hastily launching Victor's Corps for Cadiz. Victor wanted to immediately march for Cadiz and stop any attempts by the British to garrison the island. Soult opined at a war council outside of Seville, "Let me be sure of Seville, and I will answer for Cadiz."¹⁴⁷ The king ruled against the duc de Bellune and instead took the advice of Soult. This three day respite gave the swift marching Duke of Albuquerque the opportunity of reaching the Isla de Leon just two days before Victor's vanguard. Had Victor been allowed to march when he desired, the I Corps would have found the Punte Zuarrzo bridge intact and only a few hundred ragged Spanish troops to defend the island. The 1,000 man British detachment from Gibraltar did not land until 7 February, three days after the I Corps would have arrived at Cadiz.¹⁴⁸ With control of the city and harbor by Victor, the British fleet could not have landed troops on the Isla de Leon and the Anglo-Spanish COG would have been stillborn. The Isla de Leon most certainly would not have lasted long against Victor's veterans.¹⁴⁹ King Joseph's political advisor succinctly summed up the disaster of Soult's decision.

These suggestions, which were natural enough, were made, but they were not heeded. The same mistake that led to the failure of all our operations in Spain, was the cause of this irreparable blunder also. It was believed, that with the surrender of Seville the war would come to a close, just a year before the same belief had existed concerning Madrid, and there was so strong a conviction that the goal and the fruit of the expedition were to be found at Seville...¹⁵⁰

As crucial as Soult's error was in pausing a few days in Seville instead of immediately marching straight for Cadiz, it was Joseph's larger failure in properly understanding the importance of destroying the enemy's COG at Lisbon which became a major reason for Wellington's eventual success in the Peninsular War. As Clausewitz wrote, "*not by taking things the easy way—using superior strength to filch some*

*province, preferring the security of this minor conquest to great success—but by constantly seeking out the center of his power, by doing all to win all, will one really defeat the enemy.”*¹⁵¹ Joseph’s choice in filching the province of Andalusia instead of marching for Lisbon to concentrate overwhelming force against Wellington to finally eject the British Army from Portugal demonstrated that he did not recognize the center of allied gravity in the Peninsula. Had Joseph left the ineffectual Supreme Junta intact in Seville and not breached the Sierra Morena and invaded Andalusia, the jealous citizens of Cadiz most likely would not have admitted a British garrison and Wellington would have had to take his army either to the United Kingdom or other refuge outside of French controlled Europe. By Joseph’s choosing to conduct the Andalusia campaign instead of marching on Portugal, he merely created another allied COG for the price of a recalcitrant province.¹⁵²

The value of garrisoning Cadiz by the British was obvious. When Marshal Andre Massena marched against Wellington he was short personnel and supplies. Had Soult’s army not been tied up in the pacification of Andalusia and burdened by having an entire corps involved in a thirty-two month siege, those almost 60,000 soldiers could have had a decisive impact on Massena’s campaign to push Wellington into the sea. It is questionable that Wellington could have defeated such odds, even given his considerable talents and penchant for reverse slope defenses. The fact of having almost 40,000 allied troops in Cadiz impacted on Soult’s ability to mass his forces to be decisive. When sending a force to aid Massena in Portugal in early 1811, the allies used the opportunity to sortie from Cadiz and won a victory at the battle of Barossa. Simply watching the

coast and waiting for a possible allied amphibious assault wore down French assets in Andalusia.

Additionally, Cadiz became a focal point for partisan operations against the French army. Spanish ships and British vessels left Cadiz and delivered supplies, guns, specie, and conveyed intelligence to various guerrilla bands around Spain's coasts. Guerrillas linked up with regular Spanish forces and acted as guides for various regular units. Cadiz became the rally cry for many Spaniards and its freedom of the seas gave the allies tremendous flexibility.


Clausewitz's center of gravity concept readily applied to the Peninsular War. Napoleon's forces, although exceptional in comparison with the rest of Europe's armies and imbued with elan, were not provided the proper strategic objectives to win in the savage Peninsular War. **By not recognizing the enemy's COG, the French were reduced to chasing shadows instead of terminating the war as decisively as the victorious campaigns of 1805 and 1806 had done.**

MAP A




Iberian Peninsula.

MAP B



ISLA DE LEON

MAP C



City of Cadiz. Map from Ramon Solis, *Cadiz En La Cortes*.

APPENDIX A


List of British Military Aid Provided to the Cadiz Government for Distribution

| | |
|----------------------------|-----------------|
| Artillery | 342 pieces |
| Artillery Ammunition | 128,040 rounds |
| Muskets | 22,141 each |
| Carbines | 2,600 each |
| Rifles | 2,600 each |
| Pistols | 5,640 each |
| Swords | 87,229 each |
| Pikes | 68,530 each |
| Accoutrements | 99,000 each |
| Cartridges | 43,385,455 each |
| Balls | 8,459,142 each |
| Powder barrels | 28,924 each |
| Flints | 3,996,500 each |

Source: John M. Sherwig. **Guineas and Gunpowder**. (Cambridge, MA, 1973), 237.
Data extracted from P.R.O., F.O., 63/120, 28 February 1811.

APPENDIX B

Flour Barrels Imported from the United States to Iberia¹



Source: Timothy Pitkin. **Statistical View of the Commerce of the United States of America: Including Also An Account of Banks, Manufactures and Internal Trade and Improvements: Together with that of the Revenues and Expenditures of the General Government: Accompanied With Numerous Tables.** (New Haven, 1835), 119-26. The above information is extracted from tabulated data on pages 119-121.

ENDNOTES

¹ Martin Van Creveld. Supplying War Logistics from Wallenstein to Patton. (New York, 1970), 231-232, citing Carl Von Clausewitz.

² See James J. Schneider and Lawrence L. Izzo. "Clausewitz's Elusive Center of Gravity." Parameters. (September, 1987), 46, for a tongue in cheek scolding of modern Army officers whom misuse or misunderstand Clausewitz. "Today we observe a growing tendency throughout the Army to use certain theoretical terminology in a casual fashion. This tendency assumes a universal understanding of the definitions of such terms. But the use of this terminology in a professional discourse suggests the contrary; we are nearer mutual confusion than common understanding." Confusion is not limited only to the Army. "The Problem quite simply is the considerable confusion regarding concepts and definitions of 'centers of gravity' (CGs) and 'critical vulnerabilities' (CVs) which exists in the current array of Joint and Service doctrinal manuals/publications." See Joe Strange. Centers on Gravity & Critical Vulnerabilities. Building on the Clausewitzian Foundation So That we Can All Speak the Same Language. USMC Perspectives on Warfighting Series. (US Marine Corps University, Quantico, VA, 1996), #4, 1.

³ Creveld. Supplying War, 70, citing Carl Von Clausewitz.

⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz. On War. Edited and Translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret. (Princeton, NJ, 1989), 596.

⁵ For an excellent yet succinct overview of the partisan's impact on French casualties see Don W. Alexander's "The Impact of Guerrilla Warfare in Spain on French Combat Strength," The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850, Proceedings, 1975, 83-103.

⁶ For a brief history of the Peninsular War see David Gates, The Spanish Ulcer, A History of the Peninsular War. (New York, 1986). An excellent and well rounded treatment of the Spanish Army's performance in the Peninsular War can be found in Charles Esdaile's, The Spanish Army in the Peninsular War. (Manchester, 1988). Esdaile's superlative use of primary sources and relatively unbiased examination of the Spanish Army provides Napoleonic scholars with a valuable scholarly supplement of this often dismissed dimension of the Peninsular War. For details on the scope of British aid to Spain and other European nations see John Serwig's Gunpowder and Guineas, British Foreign Aid in the Wars with France 1773-1815. (Cambridge, 1969).

⁷ Clausewitz uses these criteria for other center's of gravity aside from the enemy army's center of mass:

- "1. Destruction of this army, if it is at all significant.
2. Seizure of his capital if it is not only the center of administration but also that of social, professional, and political activity.
3. Delivery of an effective blow against his principal ally if that ally is more powerful than he."

See Clausewitz, On War, 596.

⁸ The Despatches and Correspondence of the Marquess Wellesley, K.G. During His Lordship's Mission to Spain as Ambassador Extraordinary to the Supreme Junta in 1809. Edited by Montgomery Martin. (London, 1838), Extract, George Canning (Foreign Secretary) to Richard Wellesley, 12 August 1809, 193-195. Later on Canning again wrote to Richard Wellesley, "Cadiz would be essentially important. It is obvious that our operations in Spain must be defensive; that they cannot be connected with Portugal: that we must have a retreat upon Cadiz; and that retreat cannot be secure, unless, Cadiz is in our hands." See Wellington Papers, University of Southampton (United Kingdom), (henceforth cited as Wellington Papers), # 1/277, Canning to R. Wellesley, 9 December 1809.

⁹ "Our difference, then, is whether the center of gravity is strictly the greatest concentration of combat power, as a literal interpretation of Clausewitz seems to suggest, or is it a less tangible aspect such as a population center, a key communications node, or an exploitable weakness in an alliance? Am I correct?" See LTC Charles R. Viale's SAMS Monograph, "A Conversation at the Club, Another Analysis of the Concept of Center of Gravity." (School of Advanced Military Studies, February 1988), 8.

¹⁰ **Public Records Office** (Kew Gardens, London), **Foreign Office**, (henceforth cited as P.R.O., F.O.), 72/92, B. Frere to Richard Wellesley, 10 February 1810. Also, "He [Wellington] went out of his way to maintain good relations with the Spanish resistance government at Cadiz and with a number of guerilla chiefs..." see Thomas M. Huber, "*Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare*", **The Evolution of Modern Warfare**, Syllabus/Book of Readings, Course C610. (USACGSC, 1997), 158. King Joseph had already experienced the horrors of partisan warfare in Naples but seemed little energized to prevent it's outbreak in Spain. For insights into his prior experience in Italy see "Milton C. Finley, Jr., "Prelude to Spain: The Calabrian Insurrection, 1806-1807." **Military Affairs**, (April, 1976), 84-87.

¹¹ See Edoward LaPene's, *Conquete De L'Andalousie-Campagne De 1810 et 1811 Dans Le Midi De L'Espagne*. (Paris, 1823) for the French perspective on the very successful winter offensive of 1810-1811 in capturing Andalusia.

¹² See P.R.O., War Office, (henceforth cited as P.R.O., W.O.), 6/50, #35, Lord Liverpool to Wellington, 20 February 1810; also 6/50, #40, Liverpool to Wellington, 27 February 1810.

¹³ For a brief coverage see Elizabeth Longford's, **Wellington The Years of the Sword**, (New York, 1969), 225-248. For an accurate and detailed account on French operations in Portugal during this timeframe by Marshal Andre Massena's Aide de Camp see Jean Jacques Pelet's **The French Campaign in Portugal. An Account by Jean Jacques Pelet**. Edited, annotated and translated by Donald D. Horward. (Minneapolis, MN, 1973).

¹⁴ For details on King Joseph Bonaparte's rule in Spain see Owen Connon's, **The Gentle Bonaparte, The Story of Napoleon's Elder Brother**. (New York, 1968). An in-depth account on the French government of Spain during this period can be found in Rafael L. Cortada's, "The Government of Spain Under Joseph Bonaparte, 1808-1814." M.A. Thesis, Fordham University, 1968. Another cogent work on this period is Michael Glover's, **Legacy of Glory, the Napoleonic Kingdom in Spain, 1808-12**. (New York, 1971).

¹⁵ The *Dos de Mayo* (2 May 1808) is the popular term for the Spanish uprising against French occupation in the Peninsular War. Two of Francisco Goya's most famous paintings, the "*Dos de Mayo*" and "*Tres De Mayo*," dramatically depict the fervor of both sides. Both very powerful works helped to popularize the term and the passions attached thereto.

¹⁶ Marshal William Bresford was named the regent of Portugal when King Jao was evacuated to Brazil. Organizing the nation to oppose France, he activated the *Ordananza*, the ancient militia of Portugal. Men in the Ordnanza were put into two categories; the first was active duty with the British Army, while the second remained on the rolls and took part in irregular operations or in aiding Wellington scorch the countryside in front of advancing French troops.

¹⁷ See John Severn's **A Wellesley Affair, Richard Marquess Wellesley and the Conduct of Anglo-Spanish Diplomacy, 1809-1812**. (Tallahassee, FL, 1981), 22-69.

¹⁸ Other British governmental officials also sent forces without getting clearance from either the War Office or Admiralty. However, Wellington immediately dispatched a reinforced brigade of troops and supply ships to the port of Cadiz to rapidly supplement the meager Spanish defenses as did the governor of Gibraltar.

¹⁹ For details on British use of seapower in the Peninsular War see Donald D. Horward's, "*British Seapower and its Influence Upon the Peninsular War (1808-1814)*," Naval War College Review, (XXI, 1978), 54-71; also Christopher Hall's, "*The Royal Navy and the Peninsular War*," The Mariner's Mirror, (1993), 79/4, 403-418; as well as Charles John Fedorak, "The Royal Navy and British Amphibious Operations during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars", Military Affairs, July 1988, 141-46; along with Charles Oman, Wellington's Peninsular Army, 1809-1814, (London, 1905), 310-11

²⁰ If using the center of mass, or size of the army as the COG, then the French in part defeated themselves. "These four significant failures, coupled the inherent problems imposed by economic and social conditions about which Napoleon could do little combined to wreak the French army in Spain. Attrition sapped the lifeblood of the peninsular forces, and the French military and administration eventually proved unable to restore flagging vital signs with a transfusion of sufficient recruits. This collapse of Napoleon's replacement system contributed greatly to the ultimate demise of the Peninsular venture." See Don W. Alexander's, "*French Replacement Methods during the Peninsular War, 1808-1814*", Military Affairs The Journal of Military History including Theory and Technology, (December, 1980), XLIV: 27.

²¹ For an excellent current history on the French Napoleonic armies see Georges Blond, Le Grande Armee. Translated by Marshall May. (London, 1995).

²² This observation is based upon several panel discussions and between presentation conversations at two meetings this author attended of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe (1991 at Louisiana State University and again in 1994 at Huntsville, AL) among various Napoleonic scholars.

²³ *Paris, France. Chateau de Vincennes. Service Historique de l'Armee. Armee de Terre, Correspondance d'Espagne*, (Henceforth cited as *Service Historique*) Carton ⁸ 146, Soult to Berthier, 14 February 1810.

²⁴ See Eli Heckscher's, The Continental System: An Economic Interpretation. (London, 1922) for the impact of the Continental System on British commerce.

²⁵ Charles Esdaile. The Wars of Napoleon. (London, 1995), 173-80.

²⁶ For an excellent account on the usurpation of the Spanish throne see Nina Consuelo Epton's The Spanish Mousetrap: Napoleon and the Court of Spain. (London, 1973).

²⁷ The constant blockade duty was extremely wearing on the British crews posted for months off the coast of Iberia. Ships' captains grew desperate for men, in some cases they even impressed sailors from other Royal Navy vessels for their short crewed ships. See P.R.O., ADM 1/342, Berkeley to Crocker, 29 March 1810. For a cogent and well researched essay on the "Naval Arms Race" between the Royal Navy and Napoleon's 'fleet in being' and the impact on British naval policy and expenditures see Michael Glover. "Madison's Opportunity: The French Fleet in Being," American Historical Review; also Guy E. Cooper, "The Methods of Blockade and Observation Employed During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars," Journal of Royal United Services Institute, (London, 1916), LXI: 523-50. An excellent but concise study in the application of maritime strategy to peninsular operations see Piers Mackesy, "Problems of an Amphibious Power: Britain Against France, 1793-1815", Naval War College Review, (Spring, 1979), 16-25.

²⁸ Longford, Wellington, 157-169.

²⁹ See Donald D. Horward. "Admiral Berkeley and the Duke of Wellington: The Winning Combination in the Peninsula", New Interpretations in Naval History Selected Papers from the Eighth Naval History Symposium. (Annapolis, 1989), 116. Also Esdaile, Wars of Napoleon, 153, "And, finally it was British seapower that allowed the dispatch of copious supplies of arms, uniforms, supplies, and money to such penurious allies as Spain and Prussia."

³⁰ For details on Anglo-Spanish relations during the Peninsular War from October 1809 through September 1810 see volume two of Weulesclao R. Villa-Urrutia's Relaciones Entre Espana E Inglaterra Durante La Guerra de la Independencia Apuntes Para la Historia Diplomatica de Espana De 1808 A 1814. (Madrid, 1912) Three vols. For a concise treatment of US and Spanish relations during the Peninsular War see George E. Watson's, "The United States and the Peninsular War, 1808-1812." The Historical Journal. (1976); Vol. 19, Number 4, 859-876.

³¹ "In truth, the resistance offered in Andalusia to the progress of the French arms was so slight, as to lead Joseph to believe that the spirit of the people had at length been effectively humbled." See William Stothert. A Narrative of the Principal Events of the Campaigns of 1809, 1810, & 1811, in Spain and Portugal: Interspersed with Remarks on Local Scenery and Manners (In a Series of Letters). (London, 1812), 151.

³² Ramon Solis. El Cadiz De Las Cortes La Vida en La Ciudad en Los Anos de 1810 a 1813. (Madrid, 1958), 249-51.

³³ Diego F. E. Castrillon. Noticia Exacta de los Ocurrido En La Plaza de Cadiz, E Isla de Leon Desde Que El Exercit Enemigo Ocupa la Ciudad de Sevilla. (Cadiz, 1916), I: 46-52.

³⁴ "Went to Headquarters and took possession of my billet. Headquarters were established in the town of Isla. It is considered that the French can only attempt the passage of the river Santi Petri in three points, namely the Puente Zuarza, the Point of Santi Petri, and the right of the Carracas and to the left. Between these point the banks of the river are so boggy that it is inaccessible by each side." Julia V. Page. An Intelligence Officer in the Peninsula: Letters and Diaries of Major the Hon Edward Charles Cocks, 1786-1812. (New York, 1986), 53.

³⁵ Making salt had been an important industry in Cadiz for centuries. During high tides a series of sluice gates were opened in the kilometers of levees that separated the salt pits from the open sea. After the water had almost topped the levee the gates were closed and the pooled sea water allowed to evaporate. After the process was repeated over a two week period, workers would then scrape out the remaining salt, remove impurities, and then barrel it. The salt was transferred to warehouses and then traded. By the time Victor's Corps had arrived the salt works covered over 20,000 acres on and around the Isla de Leon.

³⁶ Hugh Fortescue, A History of the British Army. (London, 1928), VII:366. For a detailed description of the Isla de Leon see Jose Gomez De Arce Y Moro. Guerra de La Independencia Historia Militar De Espana De 1808 A 1814. (Madrid, 1895), IX: 11-15.

³⁷ The Spanish Navy had two main fleets stationed in El Ferrol and in Cadiz in the period following the Trafalgar debacle. Cadiz was also the home of the Spanish Navy's artillery schools and the arsenal at La Carracas which provided dry docking and other naval maintenance as needed by the navy. For an excellent treatment on the Spanish Navy in the Peninsular War see Carlos Martinez-Valverde. La Marina En La Guerra De La Independencia. (Madrid, 1974).

³⁸ Eric Christiansen, The Orgins of Military Power in Spain, 1800-1854. (London, 1967), 157.

³⁹ See P.R.O., W.O., 1/226, #397, Spencer to the War Office, 17 June 1808; Also Noticias Perteneientes a La Rendicion De La Esquadra Francesa, Compuesta De Cinco Navios Y Una Fragata, Surta En El Puerto De Cadiz, Al Mando Del Almirante Rosilly. (Cadiz, 1808), 1-8.

⁴⁰ Clausewitz. On War., 596.

⁴¹ "In short, reform in Spain achieved very little. On the one hand, Godoy's attempts to raise more money were nullified by the implications of his foreign policy, whilst on the other his efforts to strengthen the army were frustrated by vested interests, political opposition, and the hesitation of his own sponsors. Whilst still managing to stir up a hornet's nest, the favorite had in reality succeeded in doing no more than

tinkering with a few details. As a result, had the troops he attempted to mobilize in March 1808 really come to blows with the forces of Marshal Murat, it is hard to see how a Spanish Jena could have been adverted." Esdaile, The Wars of Napoleon. 185.

⁴² Adolfo De Castro, Cádiz En La Guerra De La Independencia. (Cadiz, 1862), 1-31.

⁴³ "The spirit which animates all ranks in Andalusia is beyond description. They are jealous of their Junta and do not hesitate publicly to accuse them of treason to their country. They call loudly for the immediate convocation of the Cortes." A Memoir of the Services of Lieutenant-General Sir Samuel Ford Whittingham, Derived Chiefly from his Own Letters and From those of Distinguished Contemporaries. Edited by Ferdinand Whittingham. (London, 1868), Whittingham to William R. Wyles, 22 January 1810, 122-23.

⁴⁴ The revolutionary government of Spain underwent numerous changes during its tenure at Cadiz. Following the dissolution of the Supreme Junta in January 1810 several of the delegates fled to Cadiz, where they formally dissolved the late Junta. The local Junta of Cadiz then became the 'national head' of the government until a five man Regency to rule the nation until the return of Ferdinand VII. This five man Regency ultimately itself became unpopular and eventually they gave in to the popular call for the convocation of the Cortes. The Cortes met on the Isla de Leon and produced the famous Constitution of 1812. The Duke of Wellington traveled to Cadiz in September 1812 to formally accept his new title as the Commander in Chief of Spain's armies from the Cortes. Political infighting and factionalism earmarked the sessions of the Cortes and its liberal manner and anti-militarism bent doomed its effectiveness. Ultimately Ferdinand VII defied it and had the Cortes disbanded in late 1814. See Charles Esdaile, The Duke of Wellington and the Command of the Spanish Army. (Manchester, 1990).

⁴⁵ Esdaile, Wars of Napoleon, 224-231.

⁴⁶ Clausewitz, On War, 596.

⁴⁷ Francois Vigo-Roussillon, Journal de Campagne (1793-1837), (Paris, 1838), 260-62.

⁴⁸ Joseph Bonaparte. Memoires Et Correspondance Politique et Militaire de Roi Joseph: Publiées, annotées et mis en ordre. Edited by Albert De Casse. 10 vols. (Paris, 1854-55), VII: 240, Footnote 1; also Arteché Y Moro, Guerra de La Independencia Historia Militar de Espana de 1808 A 1814. (Madrid, 1895). 14 vols. IX: 16.

⁴⁹ For details see Charles William Chadwick Oman, A History of the Peninsular War (London, 1902-30). 7 Vols. VII: 364-65; also Fortescue, British Army, VII: 343-66.

⁵⁰ In view of the importance of securing the waters around Cadiz the local Junta published a seven item proclamation outlining the necessary steps in raising a local defensive squadron of small watercraft. Unemployed sailors were impressed into service and local shippers had to furnish the vessels. See Spain, Cadiz, City and Provincial Archives. Archivo Municipal De San Fernando, (Henceforth cited as Archivo Municipal De San Fernando) carton 25, Proclamation from Gobernador el Exemo. Sr. Don Francisco Xavier Venegas de Saavedra, 31 January 1810.

⁵¹ "Albuquerque, who had started at least four days earlier, had arrived only two days before the French. From the beginning of the end of the march his cavalry had been constantly engaged against the enemy, only with the greatest difficulty covering the retreat of the infantry; and his troops generally, being denied food and forage by their countrymen both at Xeres and at Santa Maria; had dragged themselves into Cadiz utterly exhausted." Oman, History of the Peninsular War. VII: 364-65.

⁵² See John T. Jones, Accounts of the War in Spain, Portugal, and the South of France from 1808 to 1814 Inclusive. (London, 1818), 267.

⁵³ M. De Schepler, History of the Spanish Revolution and of Portugal and the War that Resulted, (Berlin, 1829), Three vols. II: 521. Albuquerque replaced Governor Venegas, who had been appointed by the unpopular Supreme Junta previous to its dissolution. Venegas was viewed as a self serving politician and sycophant.

⁵⁴ William Francis Patirck Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula and in the South of France, from the Year 1807 to the Year 1814, (London, 1876), II: 334. Albuquerque contributed to his sacking by publishing an appeal to the citizens of Cadiz to support him and pay his long overdue soldiers over the order of the Regency.

⁵⁵ There is considerable differences in opinion concerning the size and ability of the Spanish forces on the Isla de Leon to halt Marshal Victor in the January-March 1810 timeframe. Hamilton in his Annals of the Peninsular War, 324, states, "The city, in truth, was utterly unprepared for attack; the garrison was insufficient to man the works and there were not a thousand men on the Isla de Leon." Alexander Shand, in his The War in the Peninsula, 91, opined, "they had taken no precautions; it was weakly garrisoned and practically undefended." Oman in his History of the Peninsular War, III: 135 concluded that the garrison of Cadiz, like other major cities in Andalusia, would have turned the keys over to the French had the Duke of Albuquerque not stiffened their resolve. Dissenting from these British authors is Spanish Historian, Ramon Solis, who in his Cadiz de las Cortes, 24 argues that the city would have held out since they had survived other attacks in the past and had many naval vessels in the bay. Insurgent operations were also staring to have an effect on Joseph's force. See Don W. Alexander, "French Military Problems in Counterinsurgent Warfare in Northeastern Spain, 1808-1813," Military Affairs, (October 1976), 117-122.

⁵⁶ William Clowes, The Royal Navy, A History of the Earliest Times to the Present, (London, 1900), IV: 414. For details on the friction between the two allies during this time see James P. Herson Jr., "Command in Crisis: Coalition Conflict at Cadiz, 1810," Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe: 1750-1850, (Tallahassee, FL, 1992), 70-73.

⁵⁷ See Castro. Cadiz y Su Provincia, 692-97.

⁵⁸ Napier contends that it was Hookam Frere's mishandling of negotiations and failure in properly reading the national mood concerning the posting of British troops at Cadiz which had postponed the garrisoning of British troops on the Isla de Leon earlier. "and all were received with an enthusiasm showing that Sir George Smith's perception of the real feelings of the people had been just: Mr. Frere's unskillful management of the central junta had alone prevented a similar measure the year before." See Napier, History of the Peninsular War, II: 335.

⁵⁹ On two previous occasions during the Peninsular War, Britain had volunteered to garrison the Isla de Leon to aid the Spanish Government. The first instance was during June 1808 when General William Spencer landed his brigade from Lisbon arrived to offer assistance in capturing the remnants of the French Trafalgar fleet in the harbor; and on a second occasion, [almost exactly one year before the French invasion of Andalusia] Major-General Richard Mackenzie, also from Lisbon with a brigade was denied admittance to the Isla de Leon. For details on Mackenzie's fruitless quest to garrison Cadiz see London. British Library. Manuscripts ADD 39/199, Apr 1808-Jul 1811, Mackenzie Papers, Vol. X000, Selected Folios, Diary—Entry dates, 3 January through 24 March 1809. (Henceforth cited as Mackenzie Papers), also Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, II: 440-446.

⁶⁰ Upon his arrival in Cadiz on 28 January 1810, Bartholomew Frere the British Ambassador to the late Supreme Junta was petitioned by the new Spanish government to request military help from Britain. "A Junta of Defense has been elected in this town whose intention, I know from Good authority, is to call upon me for a British garrison to defend it. Without the British troops this place will fall; upon their asking me for men, can you spare 12-1500 from Gibraltar to assist and instruct the Spanish here?" University of Southampton, United Kingdom, Wellington Papers (henceforth cited as WP), 1/303, B. Frere to MG Colin Campbell [commander of Gibraltar], 28 January 1810.

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- ⁶¹ Page, Intelligence Officer, 50, Charles E. Cocks [Wellington's spy posted in Andalusia] to Wellington, 27 January 1810.
- ⁶² Napier, History of the Peninsular War, II: 335.
- ⁶³ Severn, A Wellesley Affair, 102-08.
- ⁶⁴ Carl Von Clausewitz. Two Letters on Strategy. Edited and translated by Peter Paret and Daniel Moran. (Combat Studies Institute, USACGSC, 1984), Clausewitz to Roeder, 22 December 1827, 21.
- ⁶⁵ Richard Wellesley had recently returned from Spain where he was England's Ambassador to the Supreme Junta. Upon Wellington's decision to reinforce Cadiz Richard Wellesley had his younger brother, Henry Wellesley, appointed as the new British Ambassador to Spain with his post in Cadiz.
- ⁶⁶ Weuceslao R. Villa-Urrutia, Relaciones Entre Espana E Inglaterra Durante La Guerra De La Independencia Apuntes para la Historia Diplomatica de Espana De 1808 A 1814. (Madrid, 1912), Three vols. I: 351-56.
- ⁶⁷ Severn, A Wellesley Affair, 100-25.
- ⁶⁸ Wellington Papers, 1/303, B. Frere to Wellington, 31 January 1810; see also David Cotter, "The Education of a Field Marshal—Wellington in India and Iberia," Masters Thesis, University of Massachusetts, 1992, 138-39.
- ⁶⁹ Gates, Spanish Ulcer, 209-10.
- ⁷⁰ Wellington Papers, 1/303, W. Stewart to Wellington, 31 January 1810, "I arrived here yesterday with the 79th regiment and a detachment of the 11th Regiment. Soon should arrive the 94th Regiment and detachment of the 57th and 61st Regiments, which left the Channel Island the same time I left Spithead. PS: the 94th and the detachments have just entered the river." Also Napier, History of the War in the Peninsula, I: 335, and Fortescue, History of the Army, VII: 368.
- ⁷¹ For details on this consummate naval professional see Brian Detoy's "The Early Life and Career of George Cranfield Berkeley: The Education of an Admiral, 1853-1800." Masters Thesis, The Florida State University, 1994.
- ⁷² See Donald D. Horward, "Wellington, Berkeley, and the Royal Navy: Sea Power and the Defense of Portugal (1808-1812)," British Historical Society of Portugal Annual Report and Review. (XVIII, 1991): 85-1-4; also unpublished paper, Brian Detoy, "Wellington's Lifeline: Naval Logistics in the Peninsula." Presented at the 25th Meeting of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, New Orleans, 4 March 1995.
- ⁷³ Edinburgh, Scotland. National Library of Scotland. Special Collections, MSS. (Henceforth cited as National Library of Scotland), Berkeley to Wellington, 14 February 1810. "Enclosed letters from Lieutenant Agency of Transports concerning embarkation of the Army's heavy baggage. They had to shift the materials around to different ships than urged in your paper. Also I find in Lieutenant Colonel Fisher's enclosed letter no provisions for embarking heavy baggage or stores of the artillery. We need to adopt a different plan of embarking stores/baggage. Your Quartermaster General cannot do it from afar; it isn't working and there will be discontent (by the slighted regiments). I propose a Quartermaster representative work in concert with an Agent of Transport in Lisbon to arrange and alter ships cargoes as required. They can then send plans back to your Headquarters." Such message traffic (one of many such dispatches) demonstrates that Berkeley was quite attentive to the Army's needs and displayed flexibility in trying to solve the endemic difficulties of joint logistics. Wellington's response to Berkeley was just as amicable and practical, "In reply to your letter of 14 March...and you may be certain that every possible exertion

which our present means afford shall be used to place us in the state your desire." See National Library of Scotland, MSS, Wellington to Berkeley, 25 March 1810.

⁷⁴ **United Kingdom. London. National Maritime Museum**, (Henceforth cited as Maritime Museum), A.G.C., 1/42, Stewart to Berkeley, 6 February 1810.

⁷⁵ **Houston, TX, Rice University Library. Special Collections. George Cranfield Berkeley Collection**. (Henceforth cited as Rice-Berkeley Collection), WRC/Box 4, 1809-1810, Crocker to Berkeley, #246, 16 February 1810.

⁷⁶ Berkeley understood the strategic importance of Cadiz and in consequence to the call for troops sent a ship to Cadiz to assist Admiral Purvis in defending the island since Purvis sent his transports and escorts to pick up troops in Gibraltar and Lisbon. "Am sending an escort, [HMS Rota] to Cadiz to aid Admiral Purvis in defending the island. The French are moving toward Cadiz and are only a short distance away." See P.R.O., ADM 1/342, Berkeley to Croker, 6 February 1810.

⁷⁷ Fortescue, History of the Army, VII: 368.

⁷⁸ "The French are close to Cadiz with 45,000 men and the English have taken possession of the place so that there is no fear for Cadiz whatever. We go up to the Army tomorrow morning. It is the opinion of most people that we shall not be able to stay long in this country [Portugal]." Page, Intelligence Officer, 57, Diary entry of Franklin Boverick, 24 February 1810.

⁷⁹ *Archivo Municipal De San Fernando*, Carton 25, *Edicto de Juan De la Pena y Santander*, *Secretary of the Junta Superior de Observation*, 7 February 1810. See also Robert Southy, History of the Peninsular War. (London, 1823-32), Three vols. II: 627.

⁸⁰ Charles Esdaille, "Contradictions in the Implementation of British Grand Strategy, 1808-1814." Proceedings of The Consortium on Revolutionary Europe. (Athens, GA, 1989) I: 544-559.

⁸¹ Wellington Papers, #11304, Wellington to Stewart, 7 February 1810. Wellington provided details on the chain of command, the importance of maintaining unit cohesion, instructions on sorties from Cadiz, specific insistence on troop rations to be issued in accordance with British Army Regulations for troop subsistence from Spanish supply magazines, and other related matters.

⁸² P.R.O., ADM, 1/342, Berkeley to Croker, 10 February 1810, "Reference your letter of 6 February 1810. I sent the Rota to Cadiz on 7 February with Major General Stewart and staff aboard. Mytle will follow with eleven transports carrying the men from Lisbon. Wellington requires that transports remain at Cadiz until actions are known. Also Wellington and I are sending 1,400 Portuguese troops to Cadiz on the 11th. Our own means of embarkation are now much diminished, the situation at Cadiz is serious." (This author's emphasis).

⁸³ Bowes landed on 7 February 1810 with 1,000 men and was met by Albuquerque whom, embarrassed, told him that his troops were not allowed in Cadiz but they were welcome in the town of Isla. See Wellington Papers, #11304, Wellington to Liverpool, 9 February 1810.

⁸⁴ "Some Letters from Spain," The Faugh-A-Ballagh, (Armagh, United Kingdom, 1933) Wright Knox to Samuel Knox, 13 February 1810, #134, July 1933, 138-39.

⁸⁵ Rice-Berkeley, Box 4, 1809-1810, #244, Admiralty to Berkeley, 15 February 1810.

⁸⁶ P.R.O., F.O., 72/92, Frere to Richard Wellesley, 11 February 1810. Also Napier, History of the War, II: 335.

⁸⁷ Wellington Papers, 1/303, B. Frere to Wellington, 14 February 1810.

- ⁸⁸ Wellington Papers, 1/305, Ambassador John Charles Villiers to Wellington, 6 February 1810.
- ⁸⁹ "...from the second day we landed here, there have been two 74 gun ships and about 10 or 12 gun boats keeping up a constant fire on them, and which we are told have annoyed them very much in their works and killed numbers, they have persevered and got one Battery of Six Guns up which has been firing on our ships for four days back." See "Some Letters from Spain", *Faugh-A-Ballagh*, W. Knox to William Knox, 9 March 1810, 139.
- ⁹⁰ P.R.O., ADM, 2/1369, Crocker to Various Ships Captains, 15 February 1810.
- ⁹¹ P.R.O., ADM, 72/92, Frere to Richard Wellesley, 11 February 1810.
- ⁹² See James P. Herson Jr., "For the Cause—Cadiz and the Peninsular War: Military and Siege Operations from 1808 to 1812." Masters Thesis, Florida State University, 1992, 62-75.
- ⁹³ P.R.O., ADM, 1/342, Berkeley to Crocker, 24 February 1810, "Myrtle [an 18 gun sloop commanded by Captain George Innes] returned from Cadiz with news up to the 19th, and has Purvis's letter to His Lordship of the Admiralty from the 12th. I will update Admiral Purvis's letter with intelligence to the 19th. Many detached Spanish parties arrived by sea 16-19 instant, the Spanish forces under on the Isla de Leon. Purvis sent out transports to Ayamonte to get another Division of 4,000.
Spanish Forces at Cadiz:
Cadiz -- 1st Regular Regiment 1,000
" --- Various Volunteers 3,400
Isla -- Various Regiments 16,000
Total 20,400"
- ⁹⁴ P.R.O., F.O., 72/92, B. Frere to Marquess Richard Wellesley, 11 February 1810.
- ⁹⁵ Wellington Papers, 1/303, Fisher to Wellington, 6 February 1810.
- ⁹⁶ In an early rendition of a World War II era Mulberry style artificial harbor, Captain George Landmann, Royal Engineers, made a detailed study of Cadiz in 1809 in case it was occupied by the British Army. In his plans he designed an artificial harbor and floating warehouses for supplies. "Captain Landemann of the Engineers, who was employed last year to take a plan of Cadiz, showed me a scheme of his to form an artificial harbor with jetties near the signal house and making storehouses in the rocks. Such a harbour might be secure from shot but I doubt it could be made sufficiently spacious." See Page, *Intelligence Officer*, 56, Diary entry of 17 February 1810.
- ⁹⁷ Page, *Intelligence Officer*, 56, Diary entry of 17 February 1810.
- ⁹⁸ Edward Fraser and H.F.N. Jourdain, *The Connaught Rangers*. Two Volumes. (London, 1926), II: 158.
- ⁹⁹ "Stewart's first measure was to recover Matagorda, the error of abandoning which was to be attributed as much to Admiral Purvis as to the Spaniards." See Napier, *History of the War*, II: 336. Later British Cadiz commander, Sir Thomas Graham opined on the mistake of abandoning Matagorda, "Our Navy has not shown foresight either." See Alex Delavoye, *Life of General Graham, Lord Lynedoch*. (London, 1880), 337.
- ¹⁰⁰ Auguste Carel. *Precis Historique De la Guerre D'Espagne Et De Portugal De 1808 A 1814*. (Paris, 1815), 60-62.
- ¹⁰¹ Fraser, *Connaught Rangers*, I: 158.

- ¹⁰² See Vigo-Roussillon, *Journal de Campagne*, 263-64 for the French perspective on the operation and Napier, *History of the War*, II: 336 for the British.
- ¹⁰³ *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 481, Victor to Soult, 22 April 1810.
- ¹⁰⁴ Arthur Wellesley, *Supplementary Dispatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of Field Marshal Arthur, Duke of Wellington*. Edited by the 2nd Duke of Wellington. (London, 1858-72), VI: 579-80, Henry Wellesley to Richard Wellesley, 23 August 1810; Brenton, *Naval History*, IV: 442-3; and Anthony Brett James, *General Graham, 1748-1844*. (London, 1959), 197.
- ¹⁰⁵ *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 481, Victor to Soult, 27 February 1810.
- ¹⁰⁶ Louis et Antoinette de Saint Pierre, *Memoires de Marechal Soult Espagne et Portugal*. (Paris, 1955), 167.
- ¹⁰⁷ Adolfo de Castro, *Cadiz En la Guerra De La Independencia*. (Cadiz, 1862), 33-36.
- ¹⁰⁸ Count Melito, aide to King Joseph, commented on the presence of guerrillas in the Ronda region, "During our stay at Ronda, the neighborhood was infested with brigands and bands of marauders, composed principally of the scattered remnant of General Arizaga's army. They even attempted to attack a town, but were driven back by the Grenadiers and Voltigeurs of the Royal Guard, and by a detachment of the 2nd Hussars." Minot De Melito, *Memoirs of Count Minot De Melito, Minister, Ambassador, Councilor of State, and Member of the Institute of France, Between the Years 1788 and 1815*. ((New York, 1881), 527.
- ¹⁰⁹ *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 146, Soult to Albuquerque, 14 February 1810.
- ¹¹⁰ Melito, *Memoirs of Count Minot de Melito*, 524; also Castro, *Cadiz en la Guerra*, 18.
- ¹¹¹ "I would have liked to have abstained from any political discussion, but I believe that it is relevant to observe that the cooperation of the English in the defense that Your Highness [Albuquerque] states that you would like to carry out, is a national misfortune for Spain. The day will come when the Spanish will have an aversion to those persons who presently favor the enemies of all the continental nations the execution of their designs. You Highness is too well informed to ignore that there is one nation in Europe who does not regret an alliance with, or the assistance of the English, whose politics consist of upsetting states and of then taking advantage of what is left." *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 146, Soult to Albuquerque, 19 February 1810.
- ¹¹² Melito, *Memoirs of Count Minot de Melito*, 524
- ¹¹³ *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 146, Soult to Berthier, 21 February 1810.
- ¹¹⁴ Vigo-Roussillon, *Journal De Campagne*, 254; also "Some Letters from Spain", the *Faugh-A-Ballagh*, W. Knox to William Knox, 9 March 1810.
- ¹¹⁵ *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 146, Victor to Soult, 27 February 1810.
- ¹¹⁶ Glover, *Legacy of Glory*, 162-3.
- ¹¹⁷ See Frederick Myatt. *British Sieges of the Peninsular War*. (New York, 1987), 13-28 for an excellent overview on combined arms integration and use during a formal siege.
- ¹¹⁸ *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 146, Victor to King Joseph, 3 March 1810.

- ¹¹⁹ See Gordon R. Tefteller, "British Field Leadership in 1812: A Study in the Management of Scarce Resources." Proceedings: Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1984. (Athens, GA, 1986).
- ¹²⁰ "Early in February, at the request of Spain, it was agreed to send an Anglo-Portuguese force to assist in the defense of Cadiz against an imminent threat of capture. Graham's qualifications, and his habitual success in getting on well with foreigners, marked him out as the one General peculiarly suited for the command of this force, and on February 19th he was told that he had been specially selected for the post." See Cecil Aspinall-Oglander. Freshly Remembered The Story of Thomas Graham, Lord Lynedoch, (London, 1956), 203.
- ¹²¹ Oglander, Freshly Remembered, 211
- ¹²² Delavoye, Lord Lynedoch, 308-9, diary entry of 24 March 1810.
- ¹²³ P.R.O., W.O., 1/402, #151, Graham to Henry Wellesley, 6 March 1811.
- ¹²⁴ James P. Herson, Jr., "Coalition Warfare: Civil-Military Backlash at Barossa," Selected Papers of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850, 1994. (Tallahassee, FL, 1994), 323-34.
- ¹²⁵ "Henry's varied and interesting life had shaped his mind much the same as Wellesley's and amply qualified him for the post he was to assume. The youngest prodigy of Garrett and Anne Wellesley, he was educated at Eaton, where he showed promise as a scholar." See Severn, A Wellesley Affair, 97. For an in-depth work on Henry Wellesley see Fieldston A. Wellesley, The Diary and Correspondence of Henry Wellesley, First Lord Cowley, 1790-1846. (London, 1884).
- ¹²⁶ Richard Wellesley directed that Henry press for Spanish governmental and military reform (military reform directed at both at the troop level and the coordinated actions with Wellington); aggressively petition the Spanish government to open up her South American markets to Britain in order to allow her to pay for the war and avert a fiscal collapse; as well as normal diplomatic business instructions. For details see Manhattan, New York City. New York Public Library. Special Collections. Original Precise Books of Marquess Wellesley, MS, His Secret and Official Correspondence with the American Government when Foreign Secretary. 2 Loose volumes. May 1811. Richard Wellesley to Henry Wellesley, 29 January 1810, 18 February 1810, and 26 March 1810.
- ¹²⁷ Herson, "Command in Crisis: Coalition Conflict at Cadiz, 1810," Proceedings of the Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1750-1850. (Tallahassee, FL, 1994), 74.
- ¹²⁸ Wellington's Supplementary Dispatches, VI: 490-91, H. Wellesley to Wellington, 9 March 1810.
- ¹²⁹ Wellesley, Diary and Correspondence of Henry Wellesley, the First Lord Cowley, Wellesley to Castlereagh, 26 August 1812, 65.
- ¹³⁰ Delavoye, Lord Lynedoch, 401-2, Wellington to Graham, 2 August 1810.
- ¹³¹ Wellington's Supplementary Dispatches, VI: 493, Liverpool to Wellington, 13 March 1810.
- ¹³² See Philip Guedalla, Wellington. (New York, 1931), 218-21 for a concise British description of the battle. For the French perspective see Napoleon's Correspondence with King Joseph, II: 233-5, Marmont to Joseph, 25 July 1812.
- ¹³³ Saint-Pierre, Memoires Du Marechal Soult, 310-13.
- ¹³⁴ Eugene Monglave, Siege of Cadiz. Par La Armee Francais en 1810, 1811 et 1812, (Paris, 1823), 59-60.

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- ¹³⁵ Alexander R.C. Dallas. A Second Portion of My Life. (London, 1860), I: 61.
- ¹³⁶ P.R.O., W.O., 6/44, #93, Wellington to Cooke, 12 September 1812; #95, Wellington to Cooke, 24 September 1812. Also, Wellington Papers, 1/351, Wellington to Henry Wellesley, 9 September 1812.
- ¹³⁷ Wellington, Wellington's Supplementary Dispatches, VI: 491, Henry Wellesley to Wellington, 9 March 1810.
- ¹³⁸ Fredrico Obanos Alcala del Olmo. La Marina en el Bloquer de la Isla de Leon 1810-1812. (Madrid, 1905), 390-4.
- ¹³⁹ *Service Historique*, Carton C⁸ 147, Soult to Berthier, 25 September 1811.
- ¹⁴⁰ For details on British preparation for a French amphibious invasion by the Grande Armee see Richard Glover, Britain at Bay Defense Against Bonaparte, 1803-14. (London, 1973).
- ¹⁴¹ James P. Herson, Jr., "French Innovation Versus British Technology at Cadiz, Missile Warfare in the Peninsular War." Proceedings, 25th Consortium on Revolutionary Europe, 1995 (Tallahassee, FL, 1996).
- ¹⁴² The extreme importance of the American grain trade in ensuring the allies survival in the Peninsular War can be seen in William Freeman Galpin's, "The American Grain Trade to the Spanish Peninsula, 1810-1814," The American Historical Review. (October 1922), XXVIII: 24-44.
- ¹⁴³ Wellington Papers, 9/4/2/1, Report of October 1829, comprised of the years 1809-14. These monies were a combination of foreign aid, military pay for British and allied troops, military drafts and appropriations, and logistical allowances for local purchase of food and other necessities.
- ¹⁴⁴ Delavoye, Lord Lynedoch, 397-8, Graham to Liverpool, 31 July 1810, troop list, Isla and Cadiz, 30 July 1810.
- ¹⁴⁵ P.R.O., W.O., 1/402, #249, Henry Wellesley to Liverpool, 27 August 1811. See also Severn, Wellesley Affair, 190. The training academy was eventually commanded by BG William Doyle.
- ¹⁴⁶ Whittingham, Memoirs, 149.
- ¹⁴⁷ Melito, Memoirs of Count Minot De Melito, 514; also Oman, Peninsular War, III: 135.
- ¹⁴⁸ Wellington Papers, #11304, Wellington to Liverpool, 9 February 1810.
- ¹⁴⁹ Vigo-Roussillon, Journal de Campagne, 261.
- ¹⁵⁰ Melito, Memoirs of Count Minot De Melito, 514.
- ¹⁵¹ Clausewitz, On War, 596.
- ¹⁵² "This was where the talents of the strategist were necessary; the *coup d'Oeil* to distinguish the decisive point and the resolution to concentrate everything available against it, stripping forces from secondary fronts and ignoring lesser objectives." Michael Howard. Clausewitz. (Oxford, 1983), 41.

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